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INTRODUCTION
Article III of the Constitution grants the federal courts plenary
power to adjudicate legal disputes.1 Article III also creates coveted
judicial positions so that talented and keen attorneys can serve as
federal court judges.2 It is, without a doubt, an honor to serve as a
federal judge. To some, it is heresy that once a federal court exercises its full constitutional powers, something or someone else can
undo its decision.3
1

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See id.
3
Symposium, Judicial Independence, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 389, 395 (2008) (“I do think
some of the ad hominem attacks on judges have gotten particularly nasty in the last
several years, but that may be a mark of the general polarization of parties and the political
debate we have had. Judges have taken some of the brunt. It is something that I think we
2
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The patent laws are also constitutional.4 The founders of the
Constitution deliberately chose to enshrine the grant of patent
rights in the main Constitution by allowing Congress the ability to
create and administer the patent law.5 The Constitution also empowers the government to create agencies to administer the federal
laws.6 Naturally, in promulgating laws, Congress cannot be expected to think of every contingency or every procedure, and as
such, the administrative agency is delegated the power to create the
more precise tools to administer the congressional law.7
The so-called patent law crisis that threatens to raise constitutional issues concerns how the patent laws operate within the ruought to keep our eyes on. We should try to keep the discourse civil. It is fine to criticize
judges for their reasoning or for their decisions when there is disagreement. But when
criticism turns particularly nasty and derogates into name calling, it is just possible, as
Professor Geyh pointed out in his book, that if enough mud is slung around, some of it
might actually stick. So, I think it behooves us all, whatever side of the issues we are on, to
try to keep the discourse civil.”); see generally James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, Some
Effectual Power: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 703, 773–845 (1998) (positing a distinctive role for the federal
courts in deciding a litigated case with finality, effectuality, and in accordance with all
available law).
4
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5
See id. We define the “main” Constitution as being the original Articles versus
subsequent Amendments. While some may suggest that rights enshrined in the original
Articles are more important (because they came first) than subsequent Amendments, (see,
e.g., Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Aesthetics: Appending Amendments to the United
States Constitution, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 87, 99 (2011)), others suggest that the Articles and
Amendments maintain equal footing. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress,
whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments
to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight
hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its
equal Suffrage in the Senate.”).
6
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
7
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44,
(1984) (“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation.”).

2014]

SEPARATION OF POWERS OR SEPARATION OF LAW

5

bric of judicial oversight of patent infringement and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) process. As will be
detailed herein, the problem lies in whether a defendant in a patent
infringement proceeding (the putative infringer) can invoke PTO
procedures to undo a federal court’s patent infringement verdict.
That is, because a patent infringement verdict necessarily involves
an issued and valid patent, once the infringer loses, can he get a
“do-over” by expunging or impeaching the patent back at the
PTO? And if so, under what circumstances can reexamination help
or hurt the patentee?
In Part I, we examine the basic nature of the patent process and
the advanced nature of the reexamination process. In Part II, we
discuss the potential constitutional problem (i.e., the separation of
powers) of whether the PTO violates the separation of powers doctrine by canceling the claim and its effect on parallel federal court
litigation. In Part III, we discuss the concepts of finality and the final judgment rule. We also examine in Part IV whether the Due
Process provision is implicated by canceling a federal court judgment of liability. In Parts V and VI, we examine certain remedies
that may exist for patentees and defendants. In Part VII, we examine the effect of reexamination in the pharmaceutical patent litigation context and why reexamination may be useful in that context.
I. THE PATENT AND REEXAMINATION PROCESS
A. Obtaining the Patent
To understand the constitutional non-crisis, one must understand how a patent gets granted in the first place. The inventor files
a patent application with the PTO, which then examines the application for compliance with the patent laws.8 The examination
process is iterative, with the PTO Examiner examining the application, and the inventor then amending the application and the
claims to overcome any rejections.9 An important aspect of the pa-

8
9

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 131 (2012).
Id. § 132.
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tent document is the claims section.10 The patent laws require that
a claim pass the tests of novelty11 and non-obviousness12 in order to
issue and become enforceable.13 For novelty, the inventor must
show that his invention is new and has not been disclosed in the
public domain.14 The term “prior art” is used to describe the information in the public domain, such as documents, publications,
or activities.15 Suppose, therefore, the patent application claims a
machine having parts A, B, and C. If the prior art discloses the
same machine having parts A, B, and C, then the PTO will reject
the claim for want of novelty. The patent applicant can amend the
claims to include further limitations (such as parts D and/or E) to
overcome the rejection. If the prior art fails to teach the machine
having parts A, B, C, and D, then the Examiner will withdraw the
novelty rejections.
The Examiner also reviews the application claims for compliance with the non-obviousness requirement.16 In the seminal
case of Graham v. Deere, the Supreme Court identified factors to
consider in determining if the claimed invention, though novel,
would still be obvious in view of the prior art.17 This means that the
differences between the now-claimed invention and the prior art
are not materially different or do not represent any inventive step
forward.18 So, even if the prior art does not teach the claimed ele10

See id. § 112(b) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a
joint inventor regards as the invention.”).
11
Id. § 102.
12
Id. § 103.
13
Id. § 271. Other provisions may also apply but are not necessarily relevant to this
discussion.
14
Id. § 102.
15
Id. § 102(a).
16
Id. § 103.
17
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (“Under section
103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the
subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long
felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As
indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.”).
18
Id.

2014]

SEPARATION OF POWERS OR SEPARATION OF LAW

7

ments precisely, the claim is rejected if it is obvious over the prior
art.19
The PTO construes the claim terms using the broadest reasonable claim construction.20 This means that the Examiner uses a
broad claim construction to ensure that the prior art, if it can, invalidates the claims.21 The broadest reasonable claim construction
standard is a judicial doctrine; it is not statutory.22 To illustrate this
concept, we will use the following example of an invention
throughout this article. Suppose that the initial patent claim calls
for a machine that connects two pieces by a fastener. The fastener
described in the specification includes a nail, a bolt, and a rod, but
does not describe any other fasteners such as snaps, Velcro®, glue,
or tape.23 As such, under the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard, the Office may reasonably construe the claim to include
all types of fasteners beyond those described in the specification.
This ensures that a patent does not issue if it reads on the prior art.
A federal court, on the other hand, may interpret the claim more
narrowly to be the subset of fasteners recited in the specification.24
19

Id.
See, e.g., Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(“During reexamination, as with original examination, the PTO must give claims their
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification.”); In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The broadest reasonable
construction rule applies to reexaminations as well as initial examinations.”).
21
In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1364 (“An essential purpose of patent
examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in
this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the
administrative process.”).
22
Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent
Office’s “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” Standard, 37(3) AIPLA Q.J. 285, 288 (2009)
(“During the examination process at the USPTO, the Office gives pending claims their
BRI pursuant to decades old case law.”).
23
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,652,382, col.8, l.57–60 (“In other embodiments, the
mass can be provided with encapsulated inserts for receiving fasteners such as threaded
bolts, snap fasteners, expanding fasteners, and the like.”).
24
See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We next turn to the specification, which repeatedly distinguishes
between a ‘word’ and a ‘syllabic element’ and indicates that a word is comprised of
syllabic elements, confirming our understanding of the claim language and explaining that
the terms ‘word’ and ‘syllabic element’ are not coextensive in scope.”); Abbott Labs. v.
Andrx Pharms., Inc., 473 F.3d 1196, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V.
v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 134 F. App’x. 425, 428 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding the specification
20
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If the inventor’s application is rejected, the inventor may appeal to the PTO Board of Appeals and, subsequently, to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.25 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit reviews decisions denying the patent application claims—
that is, denying patentability—for substantial evidence.26 In this
regard, once the PTO rejects the patent claims over the prior art,
those fact findings are given certain deference and the appellate
court is more inclined to affirm the invalidity of the patent claims.27
B. The PTO Reexamination Procedure
After a patent issues, it is not immune from attack—it can be
pulled back into the PTO for reexamination.28 The Director (formerly the Commissioner) of the PTO can order sua sponte, ex parte
reexamination.29 Members of the general public can instigate postissuance “reexamination”30 in form of an Ex Parte Reexamination
(“EPR”),31 a Post-Grant-Review (“PGR”),32 or an Inter Partes Review (“IPR”).33 As the name suggests, ex parte reexamination begins with an instigator to precipitate the action, but the instigator
cannot participate in the ongoing process.34 The ex parte nature is
therefore only between the PTO and the patentee.35 With IPR and
PGR, the instigator gets to participate in the process.36 The undismay implicitly define a claim term); Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
25
35 U.S.C. §§ 134(a), 142 (2012).
26
See In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The scope of our
review in an appeal from a Board decision is limited. We review the Board’s factual
findings for substantial evidence and review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo. A
finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind might accept the
evidence to support the finding.”).
27
Id.
28
35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
29
37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2014).
30
For the remainder of the article, although the term “reexamination” used to have
the independent meaning of ex parte and inter partes reexamination, we also include the
term “reexamination” to include PGR and IPR. We also note that in the AIA, the inter
partes reexamination was eliminated in favor of the inter partes review (IPR).
31
35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
32
Id. § 321.
33
Id. § 311.
34
Id. § 302.
35
Id.
36
Id. §§ 314, 324.
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puted congressional purpose in providing for reexamination is to
put a quality check on the patent process to remove improperly
granted patents.37
Instigating IPR or PGR requires a lower threshold of proof of
unpatentability.38 This threshold at the reexamination level is lower
than what is normally used in civil litigation that tests a patent’s
validity.39 Assuming that the PTO grants the post-issue proceeding
and invalidates the claim, the patentee may appeal to the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals.40 As with traditional appeals from the
PTO, the Federal Circuit uses the same standard of review.41 Because the PTO is mandated to use the broadest reasonable construction of a claim, the likelihood that prior art can apply to knock
out a claim is higher.42 In the end, if the PTO agrees that patentability is affected, the patent claim is canceled.43

37

See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Congress intended
reexaminations to provide an important ‘quality check’ on patents that would allow the
government to remove defective and erroneously granted patents.”); see also In re
Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1396–97 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The reexamination
statute’s purpose is to correct errors made by the government . . . and if need be to
remove patents that never should have been granted.”).
38
For the IPR, the threshold standard is a “reasonable likelihood” of prevailing. 35
U.S.C. § 314 (2012) (“(a) Threshold.— The Director may not authorize an inter partes
review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in
the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1
of the claims challenged in the petition.”). For the PGR, the standard is a “more likely
than not” standard. 35 U.S.C. § 324 (2012) (“(a) Threshold.— The Director may not
authorize a post-grant review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the
information presented in the petition filed under section 321, if such information is not
rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims
challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”).
39
See Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1377 (“In PTO examinations and reexaminations, the
standard of proof—a preponderance of evidence—is substantially lower than in a civil
case . . . .”).
40
35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2012).
41
Id.
42
Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“During
reexamination, as with original examination, the PTO must give claims their broadest
reasonable construction consistent with the specification.” (quoting In re Suitco Surface,
Inc., 603 F. 3d 1255, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010))).
43
See 35 U.S.C. § 307 (2012).
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C. The Effect of a Canceled Claim During Reexamination
Because the patent claim once existed, but is canceled after
reexamination, what happens to the claim itself? Is it treated as unenforceable going forward, or was it indeed void ab initio? Because
reexamination is predicated on reissue proceedings, both regimes
state that a canceled claim from reexamination is treated as if it
never issued in the first place.44 In other words, and with all things
being equal, a canceled claim never existed, and may impact any
judicial determination of the claim in prior or pending federal court
litigation.
The essence of the post-issue proceeding is that prior art may
call into question the patentability of issued claims.45 To this end,
the nature of the prior art may come from different sources.46 The
instigator may find truly new prior art that was never considered by
the PTO in the first place. The instigator may also proffer prior art
that is part of ongoing federal court litigation. We now examine the
nature of court litigation and the impact of a judgment.
44

See, e.g., In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1396–97 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“The reexamination statute’s purpose is to correct errors made by the
government . . . and if need be to remove patents that never should have been granted.”);
Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he patentee has
no rights [in a non-identical claim] to enforce before the date of reissue because the
original patent was surrendered and is dead.” (quoting Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating
and Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 827, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 568, 574 (Fed. Cir. 1984))); 35
U.S.C. § 307(b) (2012) (Reexamined “claims . . . have the same effect” as reissued
claims. Cancelation of a claim during reexamination cancels out any previous
enforcement right the patentee may have had.); Bloom Eng’g Co. v. N. Am. Mfg. Co.,
129 F.3d 1247, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Unless a claim granted or confirmed upon
reexamination is identical to an original claim, the patent cannot be enforced against
infringing activity that occurred before issuance of the reexamination certificate.”).
45
See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Before the courts,
a patent is presumed valid and the party asserting invalidity must prove the facts to
establish invalidity of each claim by clear and convincing evidence. In a reexamination
proceeding, on the other hand, there is no presumption of validity and the ‘focus’ of the
reexamination ‘returns essentially to that present in an initial examination,’ at which a
preponderance of the evidence must show nonpatentability before the PTO may reject
the claims of a patent application. The intent underlying reexamination is to ‘start over’
in the PTO with respect to the limited examination areas involved, and to re examine the
claims, and to examine new or amended claims, as they would have been considered if
they had been originally examined in light of all of the prior art of record in the
reexamination proceeding.”) (citation omitted).
46
See id.
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D. Patent Infringement: Burdens of Proof and Standards of Review
In the typical patent infringement case, the accused defendant
has the option of arguing that it does not infringe, and/or that the
relevant patent claims are invalid.47 For infringement, the patentee
bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the accused defendant infringes.48 On the other hand, for invalidity, the defendant bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the relevant claims are invalid.49 During the
invalidity phase, the patentee need not prove that its claims are valid.50 The trial court does not actually hold claims valid; because of
the statutory presumption of validity,51 the trial court only holds
that the defendant did not discharge its burden of proving that the
claims are invalid.52 For shorthand, however, we refer to the trial
court as having held a patent claim invalid or affirming its validity.53
47

See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012) (listing defenses to an infringement claim).
See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 849
(2014) (“A patentee ordinarily bears the burden of proving infringement.”); Meyer
Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc., 690 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“ . . . our
well-established law that a patentee must prove infringement by a preponderance of the
evidence.”); Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
49
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242, (2011) (“We
consider whether § 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. We hold that it does.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
619 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“An accused infringer must prove invalidity by
clear and convincing evidence.” (quoting Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc.,
189 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed.Cir.1999))); Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566
F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Because of this presumption, an alleged infringer who
raises invalidity as an affirmative defense has the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, as well as the initial burden of going forward
with evidence to support its invalidity allegation.” (quoting Tech. Licensing Corp. v.
Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2008))).
50
See Volterra Semiconductor Corp. v. Primarion, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1042
(N.D. Cal. 2011).
51
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
52
See Brunswick Corp. v. Filters, Inc. (La.), 569 F. Supp. 1368, 1376 (S.D. Tex. 1983)
(“Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that defendants have failed to discharge their
burden of proof of overcoming the presumption of validity accorded the patent in suit.”).
53
We recognize that it is awkward English to state that the trial court held that the
defendant failed to discharge its burden of proving invalidity. Similarly, technically, a
defendant does not infringe a patent either. Rather, a defendant infringes the subject
matter claimed in the patent. That is equally awkward, so we refer to conduct as
“infringing the patent.”
48
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Importantly, on appellate review, the Federal Circuit will review
invalidity determinations de novo, but based on underlying factual
considerations (for those questions of fact).54 Fact-finding by the
trial court is given deference by the Federal Circuit, as it reviews
questions of fact under the clear error standard of review.55 As
such, jurisprudentially, a Federal Circuit judge may be troubled by
the fact-finding, and may personally have found something different had he or she been the trial judge, but the standard of review
governs the ultimate appellate disposition.56 This parallel adjudication appeal to the same court of appeal is shown graphically:

The trial court, therefore, for typical invalidity determinations based on prior art, will evaluate the prior art in relation to the
claims.57 Because most of the typical invalidity arguments are based
on the prior art (e.g., novelty or obviousness), the invalidity theories are reviewed by the appellate court under deferential fact re54

See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014).
See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“On appeal from a bench trial, this court reviews the district court’s conclusions
of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.”).
56
See Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The juxtaposition
of Weinar’s positions illustrates the impropriety of an appellate court’s substituting the
personal views of its judges for that of a jury when that jury has reached a verdict based on
substantial evidence. Beyond creating an appearance of judicial arrogance, Weinar’s
suggested substitution would give those unsuccessful under the rules before a jury and a
district judge the false feeling of entitlement to a de novo approach on appeal and a new
chance to argue, this time in the abstract, that a patent is valid or invalid in light of the
prosecution history and prior art.”).
57
In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[Invalidity] is
determined by first construing the claims and then comparing the properly construed
claims to the prior art.”).
55
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view.58 Therefore, if a trial court invalidates the patent claims, the
Federal Circuit can reverse that judgment (“holding” the patent
claims valid), or can affirm the invalidity.59 Similarly, if the trial
court affirms the validity, the Federal Circuit can affirm the validity
(“holding” the patent claims valid), or reverse, and invalidate.60
But all considerations of infringement and invalidity require the
first step of claim construction.61 Because the patent claims are
words in a document, the Supreme Court has held that interpreting
just what those words mean is a question of law.62 Several examples
may be appropriate. In a first example, suppose an electronic device patent claims, among other things, a finger-swipe area to unlock a smartphone. The claim term could be construed to mean
that the finger-swipe area has to be contiguous such that the finger
swipes across the area in one linear (straight) flick. An accused infringer may have a device that has multiple finger-swipe areas that
must be depressed by separate and distinct finger presses. As such,
the claim construction could be dispositive of the infringement issue.
In a second example, suppose a contract contains a provision
that states that “the performance by Party B must be completed by
5:00 PM on Day X.” Party B is located in California (on Pacific
time) and Party A is in Maine (on Eastern time). Because of the
three-hour time difference, when is the deadline for completion? Is
it 5:00 PM Eastern time, or three hours later, at 5:00 PM Pacific
58

See Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
60
Id.
61
See Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 929, 939–40 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“Like an infringement analysis, an anticipation analysis has two parts: first, the
disputed claim terms are construed, then the construed claims are compared to the prior
art.”).
62
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“The duty of
interpreting letters-patent has been committed to the courts. A patent is a legal
instrument, to be construed, like other legal instruments, according to its
tenor . . . .Where technical terms are used, or where the qualities of substances or
operations mentioned or any similar data necessary to the comprehension of the language
of the patent are unknown to the judge, the testimony of witnesses may be received upon
these subjects, and any other means of information be employed. But in the actual
interpretation of the patent the court proceeds upon its own responsibility, as an arbiter of
the law, giving to the patent its true and final character and force.”).
59
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time? A court adjudicating the “5:00 PM” would be construing
that contract term as a matter of law. Applying the principles of
contract law to patent law—because the Supreme Court rarely reviews patent claim term constructions—the Federal Circuit is the
final arbiter of what a patent claim term means.63
The Federal Circuit has promulgated various rules on claim
construction, tools for guidance, and factors to consider.64 It is
beyond the scope of this article to discuss all available tools of construction.65 Needless to say, the Federal Circuit reviews claim constructions de novo,66 per the tools it promulgated. Unlike the PTO,
the Federal Circuit does not give any claim term its presumptive,
broadest reasonable construction.67 Rather, the Federal Circuit
may construe a claim narrowly, may construe the claim such that
the term is invalid, or may construe the claim to achieve an absurd
result.68 Accordingly, a disconnect immediately arises in the claim
construction context. The Federal Circuit may construe a patent
claim narrowly enough so as to preserve its validity, thereby not
rendering the claim anticipated or obvious. On the other hand, the
PTO will use its broadest reasonable construction standard, and
63

For another example of how claim construction can be dispositive, see Zelinski v.
Brunswick Corp., 185 F.3d 1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (construing how the weight
between two points could have been either entirely within or partially within the two
points).
64
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
65
For a description of various claim construction tools, see SHASHANK UPADHYE,
GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT & FDA LAW, §§ 2:3–2:24 (Thomson Reuters 2014).
66
See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272,
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
67
See, e.g., Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“The problem is that if the batter-coated dough is heated to a temperature range
of 400° F. to 850° F., as the claim instructs, it would be burned to a crisp. Instead of the
‘dough products suitable for freezing and finish cooking to a light, flaky, crispy texture,’
‘290 patent, col. 2, ll. 11–12, which the patented process is intended to provide, the
resultant product of such heating will be something that, in the words of one of the
attorneys in this case, resembles a charcoal briquet. To avoid this result and to insure that
the patented process can accomplish its stated objective, Chef America urges us to
interpret the claim as if it read ‘heating the . . . dough at a temperature in the range of,’
i.e., to apply the heating requirement to the place where the heating takes place (the oven)
rather than the item being heated (the dough). This court, however, repeatedly and
consistently has recognized that courts may not redraft claims, whether to make them
operable or to sustain their validity.”).
68
See id.
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might find the claimed subject matter anticipated or obvious.69 In
litigation, the more problematic consequence is that the very same
prior art that was insufficient to prove patent invalidity (by clear
and convincing evidence) due to a narrower claim construction,
may be the very prior art that can be used to knock out a claim during reexamination under a broader claim construction.
E. Parallel Reexamination and Federal Court Litigation: The Problem
of Claim Construction Standards
We alluded to the problem that claim construction itself can be
the basis of the problem. When a federal court rules on a claim construction, its decision is treated as a matter of law.70 That is, the
ruling is not based on any fact-finding or deference to the facts.71
Even early case law suggested that it is up to the courts to determine what the law is.72 As such, the Federal Circuit’s claim construction ought to be treated as “gospel.” The claim term means
69

Policy reasons exist as to why the PTO uses its broadest claim construction in
reexamination. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It
would be inconsistent with the role assigned to the PTO in issuing a patent to require it to
interpret claims in the same manner as judges who, post-issuance, operate under the
assumption the patent is invalid.”). This makes very little sense because claim
construction is a question of law that has nothing to do with presumptions of validity. The
effect of claim construction may result in subsequent invalidity, but the effect does not
color the claim construction itself. In fact, the courts have repeatedly held that claim
construction ought to occur in the vacuum of infringement or invalidity. Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (discussing that claim construction
is based on intrinsic evidence); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d
1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The court must properly interpret the claims, because an
improper claim construction may distort the [later] infringement and validity analyses.”).
70
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
71
See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272,
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“The question that this court has now reconsidered is
whether we should continue to review claim construction as a whole and de novo on the
record, or whether we should change to a different system that at best would require us to
identify any factual aspects and how the trial judge decided them, and review any found or
inferred facts not for correctness but on a deferential standard, with or without also giving
deferential review to the ultimate determination of the meaning of the claims. We
conclude that such changed procedure is not superior to the existing posture of plenary
review of claim construction.”).
72
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”).
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what the court says it means: nothing more, but nothing less. The
scope of the claim term is fixed as a matter of law.73 The PTO,
therefore, ought to be bound by the claim construction of a parallel
or prior court.
The Federal Circuit can impose this requirement of a binding
claim construction even without overtly overturning the PTO’s
broadest reasonable construction standard. The court could state
that the PTO’s construction is not supposed to be the absolute
broadest construction that is untethered to anything. Rather, the
court could state that the PTO’s broadest construction must still
follow the general rules of claim construction, such as the Phillips
standard.74 The Federal Circuit alluded to this potential harmony
in its In re Giuffrida decision.75 There, the appeal to the court was
from a typical ex parte reexamination, which had nothing to do with
the trial practice side of the new Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(“PTAB”).76 Yet, the court stated that the claim construction on
appeal was not of unbounded breadth, but instead had to be in light
of the specification, as interpreted by the ordinary artisan.77 As
such, the court was beginning to corral the scope of the PTO’s
claim constructions. Perhaps this decision began the process of
merging the PTO and the court’s claim construction standards.
But the PTO has not agreed to be bound to the parallel court
claim construction,78 nor has the court required the PTO to be so

73

See Lighting Ballast Control LLC, 744 F.3d at 1280.
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
75
See In re Giuffrida, 527 F. App’x 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“That is so even under
the Board’s view that the broadest reasonable construction of ‘portable’ requires only
that the item ‘can be carried.’ We note, however, that the Board drew its construction
from a dictionary, whereas the PTO’s traditional pre-issuance approach has been to give
claims ‘their broadest reasonable construction ‘in light of the specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.’’”) (citations omitted).
76
Id. at 986.
77
Id. at 987.
78
See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the PTO
during reexamination is not bound by a district court’s claim construction because the
PTO was not party to prior court litigation and hence no claim preclusion applied (citing
In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1296–97 (Fed. Cir. 2007))); Ethicon,
Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting the PTO’s argument
that it was bound by a court’s decision upholding a patent’s validity).
74
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bound.79 In fact, in the recent America Invents Act (“AIA”), the
new rules governing IPR indicate that the PTAB ought to use the
broadest reasonable construction.80 In its first Covered Business
Method patent review, the PTAB stated that it is not bound by
constructions of parallel courts.81 Indeed, the Office has stated that
the claim construction used to instigate the IPR may change during
the course of the IPR.82
The problem of the moral offense also becomes clear. If the
courts have ruled that, because of a certain claim construction, a
specific prior art reference fails to invalidate the claim, then a court
would naturally feel offended if the PTO not only overturns the
claim construction by construing it more broadly, but then also
uses the very piece of prior art to invalidate the claim. It would be
as if the court’s ruling and fact-finding did not matter at all. This
tone of offense was clear in the Fresenius dissent.83 Embedded within that decision was the concept that the PTO, as an Article I administrative agency, was overturning the Article III court’s decision and mandating what the court should do thereafter; i.e., when
the PTO nullified the patent, the PTO said the court should do so
too.84
If indeed claim construction is a matter of law, then the court’s
decision must bind the PTO’s claim scope determination. There is
simply no justification (anymore) for the PTO to use a different
79
See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We
have held that it is error for the Board to ‘apply the mode of claim interpretation that is
used by courts in litigation, when interpreting the claims of issued patents in connection
with determinations of infringement and validity.’” (quoting In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319,
321 (Fed. Cir. 1989))).
80
See Patent Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756; 48,766 (Aug. 14, 2012);
37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2012).
81
See SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Group, Inc., No. CBM 2012-00001, Paper No. 70
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).
82
Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, IPR2012-00001, Paper No. 26
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013) (stating that PTAB’s instigation claim construction was nonfinal).
83
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman’s dissent in this case recapped theories of the
constitutional plan, the doctrine of finality, and other arguments, but the tone was clear
that she was offended that the Patent Office could essentially overrule the court’s
decision of validity. See id.
84
See id. at 1346.
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standard because, in essence, it would be overruling a federal
court’s judgment as a matter of law.85 Our solution, therefore, is to
create a discrete set of rules that are respectful of the law and inform parties’ expectations. First, if reexamination concerns a claim
construction that has been issued by a prior or parallel federal
court, then that claim construction binds the PTO. This is consistent with the notion that claim construction is a matter of law and
that the courts are the final arbiter of what the law says.86
Second, if there is, or was, parallel court litigation, but the
court did not either construe the claim at all or did not construe the
relevant claim term specifically, then the PTO is free to use its traditional broadest reasonable construction standard. This solution is
simple and inelegant, but it works.
By requiring the PTO to respect the legal determinations of the
courts, the courts and judges are not offended by the PTO seemingly overturning the courts’ decisions. Similarly, parties and the
PTO have settled expectations as to how a claim will be construed.
II. THE NON-CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM—THE ARTICLE I
AGENCY DOES NOT TRUMP THE ARTICLE III COURT
Constitutional conspirators would read the reexaminationtrumping patent cases as conflicting with separation of powers Supreme Court precedent, citing most often to Plaut v. Spendthrift

85

Detractors might argue that because the Patent Office conducts administrative
proceedings, then the court-instigated claim construction is not actually binding. That,
however, is not a valid argument. A claim construction, as a matter of law, determines
what that claim term means for any context. That is, a term means what it means
irrespective of the forum in which the question is asked.
86
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“‘The duty
of interpreting letters-patent has been committed to the courts. A patent is a legal
instrument, to be construed, like other legal instruments, according to its tenor . . . Where
technical terms are used, or where the qualities of substances or operations mentioned or
any similar data necessary to the comprehension of the language of the patent are
unknown to the judge, the testimony of witnesses may be received upon these subjects,
and any other means of information be employed. But in the actual interpretation of the
patent the court proceeds upon its own responsibility, as an arbiter of the law, giving to the patent
its true and final character and force.’” (quoting 2 W. ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS § 732
(1890))).
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Farm, Inc.87 The patent cases do not conflict. One must keep in
mind the difference between what happens in the reexamination
context and whether that binds or otherwise mandates that actions
be taken by the courts, versus what the courts themselves do on
their own accord because of the reexamination.
After a reexamination proceeding by the Article I agency (the
PTO), the agency issues a certificate of reexamination that (in our
hypothetical) cancels the patent claim.88 The patentee, of course,
can challenge that decision, as it did in Fresenius, and we assume
for our hypothetical that the Federal Circuit affirms the PTO decision.89 By affirming the PTO decision, the court simply affirms the
cancelation of the claim. At no point during the reexamination does the
PTO direct another federal court to terminate any pending litigation.90
The certificate of reexamination simply states what happened, and
does not mandate that any other party take any other action.91 If a
court entertaining a pending litigation takes action based on its own
volition (or by motion of the accused infringer), such as dismissing
the lawsuit, then that is of its own accord or by request of a party in
suit.
The separation of powers doctrine is of no help because it is not
implicated. First, it is not an express constitutional requirement.92
No clause in the Constitution mentions any separation of powers.93
Rather, the doctrine is judicially created, based on the framework
of the Constitution that created different branches of government
in the first three Articles, and it is not an absolute.94 The Supreme
87

514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995).
Fresenius USA Inc., 721 F.3d at 1336.
89
Id. at 1338.
90
Id. at 1339–40.
91
Indeed, if Congress intended, perhaps ultimately fatally though, to strip a court of a
final judgment because of a claim canceled in reexamination, it could have done so in the
reexamination statute itself. See, e.g., Plaut 514 U.S. at 252–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing the situations where Congress has expressly set aside final judgments of
Article III courts through retroactive legislation).
92
Matthew James Tanielian, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court: One Doctrine,
Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961, 961–62 (1995).
93
Id.
94
See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 260 (“As our most recent major pronouncement on the
separation of powers noted, ‘we have never held that the Constitution requires that the
three branches of Government ‘operate with absolute independence.’’”).
88
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Court and the inferior courts have used this amalgamation approach to create a separation of powers doctrine,95 but it is not facially in the Constitution. To the extent the doctrine exists for classifying unlawful intrusion of one branch into another branch, the
Ninth Circuit’s test in INS v. Chadha (affirmed by the Supreme
Court) posed the test as:
[1] an assumption by one branch of powers that are
central or essential to the operation of a coordinate
branch, [2] provided also that the assumption disrupts the coordinate branch in the performance of
its duties and [3] is unnecessary to implement a legitimate policy of the Government.96
Using the INS v. Chadha test, the separation of powers doctrine problem fails. First, Congress created the reexamination system well aware that many times reexaminations involve co-pending
litigations.97 The reexamination system was created to vet out patent claims as an alternate forum to the courts but to leave the
courts’ ability to do so intact.98 To this end, the PTO does not assume the sole duty of vetting patents by removing such power from
the courts.99 As discussed above, the PTO’s decision does not order or mandate the courts to take any action, and hence, the PTO
does not assume the power to dismiss litigation or the like.100 The
PTO’s decision to cancel claims does not disrupt the ability of the
courts to perform their duties.
Plaut does not help either. In Plaut, there was direct interference between Congress and the courts.101 The plaintiffs in a securities fraud litigation filed suit on a certain date.102 During the pendency of the case, the Supreme Court ruled in another case that the
deadline to file suit had to occur within a certain time period.103 As
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

See id.
INS v. Chadha, 634 F.2d 408, 425 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
See id. at 1336–38.
See id.
See id. at 1338.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 215–16 (1995).
Id. at 213.
Id. at 214.

2014]

SEPARATION OF POWERS OR SEPARATION OF LAW

21

such, the Plaut suit was then dismissed as being untimely.104 The
Plaut plaintiffs never appealed, and hence the dismissal was
deemed final.105 The Plaut case was over, completely. Later, Congress passed a law that overruled the Supreme Court’s deadline to
file suit decision, extended the deadline, and—ultimately fatal to
the law—Congress ordered that previously dismissed cases that
were previously deemed untimely filed were now to be reopened by
the courts and considered timely filed.106 The law also gave retroactive effect to the previously filed cases.107 When the Plaut plaintiffs
filed the required motions to reopen the suits, the trial court agreed
that the conditions set forth in the new congressional law were met,
but ruled the law unconstitutional.108 In affirming, the Supreme
Court noted specifically that the congressional law was unconstitutional because it precisely required the federal courts to exercise
judicial power.109
Proponents of the “reexamination to cancel claims” school of
thought can distinguish Plaut on several grounds. First, in Plaut,
Congress was the opposing branch of government in the form of a
law, rather than an underlying agency.110 In reexaminations, the
PTO acts on the will of Congress pursuant to its expertise in administering the patent laws.111 Second, the congressional law in Plaut
was an express order to the courts to act.112 In reexamination, there
is no such final order to the courts to act.113 Finally, the PTO is acting within its statutory ambit and, thus, it is up to Congress to remove that statutory authority; it is not up to the PTO to choose not
104

Id.
Id.
106
Id. at 214–15.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 215.
109
Id. at 217–18 (“We conclude that in § 27A(b) Congress has exceeded its authority by
requiring the federal courts to exercise ‘[t]he judicial Power of the United States,’ U.S.
Const., Art. III § 1, in a manner repugnant to the text, structure, and traditions of Article
III.”).
110
Id. at 218–21.
111
See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
112
See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 217–18.
113
Id. at 252–59 (1995) (“If Congress may enact a law authorizing this Court to reopen
decisions that we previously lacked power to review, Congress must have the power to let
district courts reopen their own judgments.”).
105
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to act when the law requires it to do so simply in fear of a potential
constitutional issue.114
Finally, one can even state that the separation of powers doctrine is not even implicated in the first instance. The Federal Circuit is an Article III constitutionally created court.115 The Article III
Federal Circuit appeals court is the same court, whether any appeal
is from the PTO or from the district courts.116 As such, even if the
Federal Circuit affirms the PTO cancelation of claims, as an Article
III appellate court, it can order an Article III federal district court to
take action.117 In the strange circumstance that one panel of the
Federal Circuit is hearing the district court appeal and another panel is hearing the PTO appeal, the court has its mechanisms on how
to resolve those cases as they are the same court, albeit different
panels.118 As such, the Federal Circuit speaks with one voice, and
decisions within its own court do not raise separation of powers
problems.
In the end, there is no inherent, structural constitutional separation of powers problem, though a problem might arise when actual litigants attempt to game the reexamination system to avoid
liability.
III.

THE FINAL JUDGMENT PROBLEM AND THE QUEST
FOR FINALITY
Ultimately, in a federal lawsuit, there is a judgment. When that
judgment is final, there must be some finality. That is, assuming
the infringer loses, the loser must at some point accept judgment
no matter what may happen to the patent later. Of course, if the
parties settle, the parties can craft the settlement contract to account for later changes. For example, under the final judgment
rule, once an infringer loses the case (finally), pays damages, and is
enjoined, if the patent is later invalidated, the infringer cannot seek

114
115
116
117
118

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
Id. § 1295.
Id.
Id. §§ 1291–96.
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its money back.119 Under a settlement, if the parties contract that
obligations to pay are conditional on continued patent validity, then
those terms will prevail.120
The putative constitutional problem lies in the concept of a final judgment. Where the litigation is ongoing on parallel reexamination and invalidates the patent, what happens then? What happens if the litigation is finally over? And what happens if parts of
the litigation are over, yet some are still pending? In short, when is
final really final?
The timing of finality matters. Finality means that the Article
III court no longer is adjudicating the case, and only the judgment
is left to execute. The constitutional problem may lie in attempts to
get around the final judgment in order to avoid initial liability.
A. Pending Court Litigation With Concurrent Reexamination: When
is a Decision Final?
Defining finality can be problematic. Suppose the patentee
sues, and the accused infringer immediately instigates a reexamination. Because of the speed of reexamination, the claims in the patent are nullified prior to the district court litigation verdict. The
district court ought to dismiss the patent litigation because no valid
claim remains. If the accused infringer is finally liable (by appellate
court ruling) and is ordered to pay damages, a later reexamination
decision that nullifies the patent claims ought not strip the patentee
of his award. The complication arises when parts of the district
court litigation are still pending when the PTO nullifies the claims.
Is there yet any final judgment? We now explore whether the patentee’s rights and the effect of a reexamination decision nullifying
the claims simply collapse into one of timing.
In its recent Fresenius decision, the Federal Circuit reasserted
the claim that “an interim decision in one suit . . . cannot prevail
over a final judgment on the same issue in another suit.”121 Ironi119

Id. § 1291.
See Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Troxel Mfg. Co.
v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1972); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29,
32 (1964) (“[A] patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration
date of the patent is unlawful per se.”).
121
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
120
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cally enough, the court made this statement, and then proceeded to
vacate what the court itself considered to be a district court “final
judgment” of patent infringement,122 because an interim reexamination in the PTO ruled that the patent claims were invalid while
the litigation was pending appeal.123 But if a United States Court of
Appeals can refer to a district court judgment as “final” and then
abrogate the decision based on a subsequent ruling under Congressional authority, what does “final” really mean? Lack of an answer
imperils the delicate, fundamental balance of fairness and equity
with efficiency and clarity upon which our federal court system
prides itself.
This Part of the Article begins with an exploration of the real
meaning of federal judicial “finality” and compares the potential
consequences to litigation of initiating and completing a USPTO
reexamination before the completion of patent infringement litigation with instituting a reexamination only after adjudication on the
merits. We then examine the different procedural avenues open to
litigants to raise legitimate challenges to judicial finality—including
opportunities within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure124 and
through collateral attack125—and explain how principles including
res judicata126 and collateral estoppel127 all but foreclose such opportunities to an alleged infringer seeking to overturn an adverse
infringement ruling.

122

Id. (“In light of the cancellation of Baxter’s remaining claims, Baxter no longer has a
viable cause of action against Fresenius. Therefore, the pending litigation is moot. We
vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.”) (emphasis
added).
123
Id. at 1336.
124
See FED. R. CIV. P. 59, 60.
125
See Popp Telcom v. Am. Sharecom, Inc., 210 F.3d 928, 941 (8th Cir. 2000) (“An
action with an independent purpose and contemplative of another form of relief that
depends on the overruling of a prior judgment is a collateral attack.”).
126
See Oreck Direct, LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 560 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Res
judicata prevents a later suit . . . from collaterally attacking a prior judgment by a court of
competent jurisdiction.”).
127
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970) (“It [collateral estoppel] means
simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit.”).
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B. Finality
For all intents and purposes, the Supreme Court settled this
dispute 150 years ago, when it held that Article III judgments are
“final and conclusive upon the rights of the parties.”128 The
Court’s twentieth-century decisions echo this policy, defining a
“final decree” as “one that finally adjudicates upon the entire merits, leaving nothing further to be done except the execution of
it.”129 The Court even made it clear that “a right, question or fact
distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.”130
With respect to finality prior to adjudication of all merits, appellate decisions stated that the point of finality in litigation comes
even prior to adjudication of all of the merits.131 While one early
Supreme Court decision considered a judgment to preclude relitigating any previously raised claims or defenses,132 another decision
seems to suggest that the Court finds the adjudicated nature of an
action unchanged regardless of whether judgment has been entered.133 More recently, the Second Circuit stated:
Whether a judgment, not ‘final’ in the sense of 28
U.S.C. § 1291, ought nevertheless be considered
128

Gordon v. U.S., 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1864).
John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U.S. 82, 88 (1922).
130
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
131
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1,
7–8 (1980).
132
See Cromwell v. Sac Cnty., 94 U.S. 351, 352–53 (1876) (“The judgment is as
conclusive, so far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as though the defences
never existed. The language, therefore, which is so often used, that a judgment estops not
only as to every ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate, when
applied to the demand or claim in controversy. Such demand or claim, having passed into
judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at
law upon any ground whatever.”).
133
See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 292–93 (1888). (“The essential
nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment
upon it; and the technical rules, which regard the original claim as merged in the
judgment, and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant to pay it, do not
preclude a court, to which judgment is presented for affirmative action, (while it cannot
go behind the judgment for the purpose of examining into the validity of the claim,) from
ascertaining whether the claim is really one of such a nature that the court is authorized to
enforce it.”).
129
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‘final’ in the sense of precluding further litigation of
the same issue, turns upon such factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly
tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review.134
The Fifth Circuit has supported this contention, declaring that
“[t]o be final a judgment does not have to dispose of all matters
involved in a proceeding.”135
Though patent infringement litigation would appear to be just
one example of using Article III courts to enforce rights constitutionally administered by an Article I agency, the well-intentioned
division of powers permits those challenging a patent’s validity to
have “‘two bites of the apple.’ A nonpatent holder is permitted to
both challenge a patent in the PTO and the district court.”136 Indeed, to enforce a patent in federal court, “[a] necessary condition . . . is the existence of [a] valid . . . patent[].”137 Many alleged
infringers have availed themselves of the opportunity to administratively challenge patent validity through PTO reexamination
procedures,138 whether prior to, during, or subsequent to infringement litigation. An analysis of the different points at which an infringement defendant asserts invalidity through the reexamination
process will expose the comparative inequities in the consequences.
1. Reexamination Concludes Before Adjudication on the
Merits
Strangely at odds with the abrogative authority that the Federal
Circuit accorded to a reexamination finding of invalidity in the Fre134

Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961).
Pye v. Dep’t of Transp. of Ga., 513 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1975). Finality includes
prior-adjudicated issues that are “sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect,” and
“a judgment may be final in a res judicata sense as to a part of an action although the
litigation continues as to the rest.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13(e)
(1982).
136
McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 767 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (D. Colo. 1991).
137
Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 159 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
138
35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (“Any person at any time may file a request for
reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited
under the provisions of section 301.”).
135
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senius decision, the court took the position that confirmation of
claim validity during reexamination cannot be conclusive such as to
preclude litigation of the patentability issue.139 This view has not
stopped a federal district court from asserting that when the PTO
issues a Reexamination Certificate, the burden of proving invalidity
“is more difficult to satisfy, especially because all the prior art
upon which it bases its anticipation defense . . . was before the examiner at both the original and the reexamination proceeding.”140
District courts have accorded differing levels of authority to reexamination results, including considering them “highly probative,”141 or giving them “deference”142 or a “presumption of valid139

Greenwood v. Hattori Seiko Co., Ltd., 900 F.2d 238, 240–41 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“In
an infringement suit before a district court, the invalidity of a patent under 35 U.S.C. §
103 must be decided on the basis of prior art adduced in the proceeding before the court.
The issue cannot be decided merely by accepting or rejecting the adequacy of the
positions taken by the patentee in order to obtain a Certificate or Reexamination for the
patent. Once issued by the PTO, a patent is presumed valid and the burden of proving
otherwise rests solely on the challenger.”). See also Sawgrass Sys., Inc. v. BASF Corp.,
No. 2:98-3574-11, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18198, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 1999) (“[A] reexamination is an ex parte proceeding which is not binding a district court that evaluated
the validity of a patent at a later date. Indeed, in evaluating the validity of a patent, a
district court must make an independent evaluation thereof, and may not simply rely
upon the opinion of a patent examiner to determine a patent’s validity.”).
140
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Polaroid Graphics Imaging, Inc., 706 F. Supp.
1135, 1141 (D. Del. 1989).
141
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cetus Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1174, 1179 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (“The court therefore regards the PTO’s reexamination findings of validity for all
claims . . . as highly probative on the issues considered and with respect to the prior art
considered during reexamination”); Quantachrome Corp. v. Micromeritics Instrument
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1185 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (“The burden of proving the invalidity
of a patent that has been subject to reexamination is even heavier than it would be in the
absence of reexamination because the findings of the Patent Office are highly probative on
the issues where prior art was considered.”).
142
Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH, 271 F. Supp. 2d 64, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2002)
(“This court accords due deference to the PTO’s decision regarding the validity of
the . . . patent in any potential future appeal. . . . [T]he PTO is a technically specialized
administrative agency well-equipped to examine and determine patentability.”); Ramp
Research & Dev. v. Structural Panels, 977 F. Supp. 1169, 1176–77 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“The
Court should give deference to the expertise of the Patent Office where the PTO twice
found the invention patentable initially upon reexamination. . . . The burden of proving
invalidity is made heavier when the patent has survived a reissue or reexamination in the
PTO.”). One court qualified such deference, stating, “Deference due to PTO findings
upon reexamination is appropriate only with respect to the evidence and prior art that was
before both the PTO examiners and the Court.” Cetus Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1180.
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ity.”143 Giving affirmative reexamination decisions such authoritative weight makes sense, because even without further recourse
through the PTO, an alleged infringer still has litigation options
after a patentee wins on the reexamination decision.144
2. Adjudication on the Merits Concludes Before
Reexamination
As Fresenius made clear, when the analysis turns to infringement litigation that concluded prior to reexamination, other administrative proceeding, or intervening controlling authority, federal
final judgments have not been treated with the same deference as

143

Am. Permahedge, Inc. v. Barcana, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 308, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(“Upon issue, a patent is endowed with a statutory presumption of validity pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 282, which is strengthened where . . . the patent undergoes reexamination.”).
Another court detailed the rationale behind the presumption:
The Federal Circuit has held that a district court, in deciding a claim
of patent invalidity, must give “credence” to a PTO reexamination
proceeding, which has upheld the validity of patent claims involved in
the litigation, where the prior art asserted in the district court was
“much the same” as the prior art presented before the PTO in the
reexamination. . . . Accordingly, when the PTO, upon reexamination,
has confirmed or amended patent claims despite certain prior art, a
district court analyzing the validity of those claims – in light of the
same prior art – must recognize a rather formidable presumption of
validity.
In re Laughlin Prods., Inc., Patent Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 525, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
144
Greenwood v. Seiko Instruments & Elecs. Ltd., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455, 1456 (D.D.C.
1988) (“[T]he reexamination statute does not provide for review of a decision favoring
the patentee.”); Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 882 F.2d
1570, 1573–74 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Congress intended to limit appeals from final
reexamination decisions to those initiated by patent owners seeking to reverse an
unfavorable patent decision. . . . [A] third party requester has some rights . . . [but] no
right to challenge the validity of the Reexamination Certificate by suit against the
PTO.”); Yuasa Battery Co. v. Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1143,
1144 (“[T]he statutory provisions regarding the reexamination of a patent and the rules
promulgated in support thereof do not provide . . . for judicial review of a decision
rendered in a reexamination proceeding for any party other than the patent owner.”).
However, third parties still have options following reexamination, because “[a]n ex parte
reexamination carries no threat of an estoppel against an unsuccessful third-party
requester. The requester can continue to contest validity in a judicial action although a
PTO confirmation will tend to make that contest more difficult.” 1-SA02 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.3.4.5 (2013).
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prior-concluded reexaminations.145 Forming a consensus about the
point of finality in prior litigation—analogous to the granting or
denial of a Reexamination Certificate—seems crucial to fairness
and equity. The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit both suggested that final judgment would provide that determinative punctuation.146 However, as we have seen, finality may attach even prior
to the entering of final judgment.147 We now examine the different
points at which courts have suggested that final judgment occurs.
a) After decision on the merits, but before the damages
award?
Both courts and federal supplements generally agree that no finality attaches to decisions on the merits without determining
damages. In Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., a Federal Circuit
case, Mendenhall sued both Astec and Cedarapids simultaneously.148 The Astec suit upheld Mendenhall’s patent claims, and the
Federal Circuit affirmed the findings, then remanded “for determination of damages and other issues.”149 While the remand was
pending, the Cedarapids court concluded that the same patents
were invalid, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the ruling.150 Astec
moved, unsuccessfully, its trial court to vacate the affirmed liability
judgment.151 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that when a federal appellate court upholds patent claims but remands for damages

145

See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(“In light of the cancellation of Baxter’s remaining claims . . . [w]e vacate the district
court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.”).
146
Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1943)
(“[T]he court did not lack power at any time prior to entry of its final judgment at the
close of the accounting to reconsider any portion of its decision and reopen any part of the
case.”); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he
law of the case doctrine ‘merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to
open what has been decided, not a limit to their power.’” (quoting Messenger v.
Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912))).
147
See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961); Pye
v. Dep’t of Transp. of Ga., 513 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1975).
148
Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1576.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. In other words, Astec was first to litigate and lose liability. Cedarapids was second
to litigate but got a favorable invalidity ruling.
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proceedings, no final judgment has been entered.152 Secondary
sources agree that, in the absence of fixed remedies, a liability determination is not final.153 However, one federal district court initially refused to allow merely potential prospective intervening authority to void findings of validity and infringement even absent
determination of damages.154 That outlier court was quickly overruled by the Federal Circuit, which countered:
The district court incorrectly concluded that the
reexamination decision can have no effect on this infringement suit even if the reexamination decision
becomes final. . . . [I]f the reexamination decision of
unpatentability is upheld in the court action . . . the
152

Id. at 1580. The court explained,
[T]his court did not rule that the patents were “valid” in its prior
Astec judgment but rather ruled that Astec failed to establish the
merits of its defenses of inequitable conduct and invalidity. Thus, this
court did not “overturn” its prior Astec rulings respecting validity by
the Cedarapids judgment of invalidity, and it does not do so here by
recognizing the overriding defense of collateral estoppel. Secondly,
the judgment of this court on liability in Astec resulted in a remand for
further proceedings. It was not the final judgment in the case. To rise
to that level, the litigation must be entirely concluded so that
Mendenhall’s cause of action against Astec was merged into a final
judgment.
Id. The Court described the invalidation of the asserted patent in the Cedarapids litigation
as “intervening controlling authority.” Id. at 1583.
153
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13(b) (1982) (“Finality will be
lacking if an issue of law or fact essential to the adjudication of the claim has been
reserved for future determination, or if the court has decided that the plaintiff should
have relief against the defendant of the claim but the amount of damages . . . remains to be
determined.”); 18A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4432 (2d ed. 2002) (citing G. & C. Merriam Co. v.
Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 28, 29 (1916)) (“An order that establishes liability but leaves open
the question of damages or other remedies . . . [is] not final for purposes of preclusion
under traditional analysis.”).
154
See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 1072, 1075–76
(W.D. Mo. 1993) (“In this case, this Court returned a plaintiff’s verdict. The appellate
court affirmed this Court as to the issues of patent validity and infringement. It remanded
the matter to this Court solely for the purpose of determining the appropriate amount for
damages. The issues of patent validity and infringement have been fully decided as to this
case. This Court apprehends of no case or rule of law that holds that a final judgment in a
separate lawsuit, in a separate jurisdiction, which may or may not be rendered at some
undetermined point in the future would control and, indeed, void this Court’s judgment
in this case.”).
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injunction would thereby immediately become inoperative. In addition, if a final decision of unpatentability means the patent was void ab initio, then
damages would also be precluded.155
b) After damages award?
The focus on the existence (or nonexistence) of a damages verdict is a sticking point. But if a damages verdict exists, then courts
should consider the judgment as final. Even then, however, the existence of a damages verdict was not always deemed sufficient.156
Similarly, in Translogic Technology Inc., v. Hitachi, Ltd., the patent
owner had already prevailed on validity and infringement, received
an award of damages, and had a permanent injunction entered in its

155
Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 996 F.2d 1236, 1236 (Fed. Cir.
1993). In Standard Havens, the patentee won liability at trial and the Federal Circuit
affirmed the liability holding. The Federal Circuit though remanded for reconsideration
of damages and remedies. The trial court refused to stay the damages and remedies
portion of the case in view of a pending reexamination proceeding. The Federal Circuit
again reversed the denial of the motion to stay and the re-imposition of the injunction
because the trial court improperly “concluded that the reexamination decision can have
no effect on this infringement suit even if the reexamination decision becomes final.”
Standard Havens, 996 F.2d at 1236. However, in another case, the Federal Circuit cited
the rule in Forgay that “[w]hen the decree . . . directs the defendant to pay a certain sum
of money to the complainant, and the complainant is entitled to have such decree carried
immediately into execution, the decree must be regarded as a final one to that extent.”
King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 814 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting
Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 204 (1848)). In so citing, the court concluded, “Despite
the fact that the issue of spare parts damages is still pending in the District Court, the
Modified Judgment is appealable to this court under the Forgay rule.” Id. at 1563. See also
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman,
J., dissenting) (“In distinction from the procedure here ratified, where this court holds
that neither the PTO nor this court is bound by this court’s prior decision, the principles
of judicial finality are respected in every other circuit.”); id. at 1375 (O’Malley, J.,
dissenting) (“[D]amages were not still at issue when the action was remanded to the
district court, and were not at issue when the PTO rendered the decision which the panel
majority gives such broad-sweeping effect. And, the panel majority’s view of finality is
significantly out of step with the law as it stands today.”).
156
See Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1578 (“For this court to affirm the findings of
infringement and the willfulness of conduct against one appellant, increase damages
against the other, and uphold injunctions against both, appears anomalous in the extreme
in connection with patents this court has just held invalid.”). The court concluded,
“Because the Mendenhall patents are invalid, the plaintiffs cannot now enjoin or recover
damages from these defendants.” Id. at 1584.
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favor.157 While the defendant’s appeal was pending, the Federal
Circuit affirmed a reexamination decision that invalidated the asserted patent claims.158 Subsequently, the court vacated the district
court’s judgment for infringement liability and remanded for dismissal.159 So, in conclusion, not even a damages verdict was enough
to make a case “final” for the purposes of a final judgment.
c) If not after final judgment, then when is a decision final?
If a final judgment on damages is not enough, and usually damages is the last phase of a case, then it is fair to ask when a decision
is finally final. Based on appellate precedents, the answer may
simply be: “Never.” The Supreme Court held that “[r]eversal and
remand for further proceedings on the entire case defeats preclusion entirely until a new final judgment is entered by the trial court
or the initial judgment is restored by further appellate proceedings.”160 Furthermore, the Court ordered a district court to apply
intervening legal developments affecting a patent’s validity, even if
an appellate court previously upheld the validity of the patent
claims.161 Though nondisclosure of prior art by a patentee may reasonably warrant granting relief from a trial court order to execute
final judgment,162 the Federal Circuit has upheld invalidation of a
157

404 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1251 (D. Or. 2005).
In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
159
Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 250 F. App’x. 988, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, Translogic Tech can be summarized as follows: The patentee won at trial that
the patent was valid and infringed. The trial court awarded damages and a permanent
injunction. During the appeal of the litigation side, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
reexamination decision holding the patent claims invalid. The Federal Circuit litigation
appeals panel thereafter vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for dismissal.
160
G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22, 28 (1916).
161
See John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U.S. 82, 89 (1922) (“As to the claim
of patent infringement, the [validity] decree evidenced a quasi definitive decision adverse
to plaintiffs, which, if nothing occurred to prevent, would in due course be carried into
the final decree. But it did not constitute a separation of the cause, nor dismiss defendant
from the jurisdiction for any purpose; necessarily this decision remained in abeyance until
the cause should be ripe for final decree; there was nothing to take the case out of the
ordinary rule that there can be but one final decree in a suit in equity.”).
162
See Flexiteek Ams., Inc. v. Plasteak, Inc., No. 08-60996-civ-Cohn/Seltzer, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 156086, at *9–11 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2012) (“[I]n this case, Plaintiffs
specifically disclaimed knowledge of any prior art, and Defendants only learned of the
prior art through the filings of another party in an unrelated suit to which Defendants
were not a party. Defendants then acted promptly, informing the Court of their intention
158

2014]

SEPARATION OF POWERS OR SEPARATION OF LAW

33

patent based on a reexamination that not only had been litigated
and held not invalid eleven years earlier, but was initiated by a litigant.163 Finally, the Fresenius court believed that a judgment final
enough from which to appeal was nevertheless “not sufficiently
final” to proscribe application of subsequent final judgment in
another case.164
3. How is the Disparity Justifiable Between the Comity of the
PTO and the Courts?
The two different entities involved in reexamination and litigation (the PTO and the courts, respectively) do not practice comity.
If courts openly consider and even rely on reexamination findings,
how is it that final court judgments of patent validity and infringement are not accorded reciprocal respect? Courts have trotted out
a variety of justifications for such inequity. The Federal Circuit in
Ethicon opined that a decision to uphold patent validity only means
that the alleged infringer did not sustain its burden of proving invalidity, and therefore yields no issue preclusion.165 As a parallel argument, the court considered the requirement of a “substantial
to rely on those documents within five weeks of the documents’ filing. At that point, it
was only two and a half months before trial. Because of Plaintiffs’ dissembling,
Defendants had limited time to act, but they acted diligently. Accordingly, the Court
concurs . . . that Defendants were not sitting on their reexamination rights awaiting
trial.”).
163
See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1257 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This
reexamination appeal raises a fundamental question – is a final adjudication, after trial and
decision in the district court, and appeal and final judgment in the Federal Circuit, truly
final? Or is it an inconsequential detour along the administrative path to a contrary result?
Although final decisions of courts of last resort are preclusive within the courts, is the
administrative agency excused? Here the Patent & Trademark Office did not mention the
prior adjudication of the same issue, although that issue was finally decided in the courts
in 2001. The PTO’s reexamination decision is now before us on appeal, the same issue
that we finally adjudicated eleven years ago.”)
164
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(“[W]hile the district court in 2007 entered a judgment final for purposes of appeal, and
that judgment might have been given preclusive effect in another infringement case
between these parties, it was not sufficiently final to preclude application of the
intervening final judgment in In re Baxter, and in any event, we set the district court
judgment’s aside in the first appeal in the infringement case.”).
165
Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The doctrine of
collateral estoppel does not prevent the PTO from completing the reexamination. Courts
do not find patents ‘valid,’ only that the patent challenger did not carry the ‘burden of
establishing invalidity in the particular case before the court.’”) (citations omitted).
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new question of patentability” under 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) to refer to
a question that was never analyzed specifically by the PTO, even if
previously scrutinized by a federal court.166 A trial court in California defended the reliance on reexaminations as opposed to validity
and infringement judgments by citing the fact that a reexamination
accords no presumption of validity to a patent and thus requires a
higher evidentiary standard of proof for invalidity than an invalidity
defense in infringement litigation, in which patent claims are held
presumptively valid.167
166

In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The Board did not err in
holding that the prior district court litigation did not prevent [a] reference from raising a
‘substantial new question of patentability’ under § 303(a). As properly interpreted, a
‘substantial new question of patentability’ refers to a question which has never been
considered by the PTO; thus a substantial new question exists even if a federal court
previously considered the question.”).
167
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cetus Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1174, 1179 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (“[T]he PTO’s findings should be given substantial deference . . . [because]
whereas in litigation challenging validity the challenged patent enjoys a presumption of
validity that the challenger must overcome by clear and convincing evidence, in a
reexamination proceeding, the posture is essentially that of an initial PTO examination,
and the patent enjoys no presumption of validity. It is therefore highly
significant . . . [when] patents [a]re upheld by the PTO against a higher standard than that
to be applied by this court. . . . Secondly, this litigation and the PTO reexamination differ
in their approach to claim construction in a way which favors the patent owner in this
proceeding. Whereas claims in reexamination “will be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation,” thus increasing the likelihood of a finding of anticipation and therefore of
invalidity, claims in litigation are to be “so construed, if possible, as to sustain their
validity.”).The Federal Circuit agreed:
[T]he court’s final judgment and the examiner’s rejection are not
duplicative—they are differing proceedings with different evidentiary
standards for validity. Accordingly, there is no Article III issue
created when a reexamination considers the same issue of validity as a
prior district court proceeding. And as interpreting a “substantial
new question of patentability” to include questions considered by a
federal court but never by the PTO does not raise any constitutional
concerns, the canon of statutory construction providing that a statute
that is ambiguous should be interpreted to avoid raising “grave and
doubtful constitutional questions” is not applicable.
Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1379 (citation omitted). The Federal Circuit has also defended any
disharmony with USPTO findings, stating:
The awkwardness presumed to result if the PTO and court reached
different conclusions is more apparent than real. The two forums take
different approaches in determining invalidity and on the same
evidence could quite correctly come to different conclusions.
Furthermore, we see nothing untoward about the PTO upholding the
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The Federal Circuit has proffered other arguments, including
noting that the “reasonable Congressional purpose of facilitating
the correction of governmental mistakes” prevails over mistakenly
allowed patent claims and does not offend the Constitution.168
Courts have also analogized to stayed interference proceedings,
which cannot be maintained if claims are cancelled during reexamination,169 or lawsuits pending while claims are cancelled pursuant to a patent reissue, which similarly must be dismissed.170
4. Counterarguments Against Nullifying Court Verdicts
Through Reexamination
The above rationales for vacating final judgments of validity
and infringement based on subsequent reexamination determinations include plausible—albeit sometimes hair-splitting—reasons
for pursuing such judicial action. Policy arguments and potentially
alarming consequences, however, weigh strongly against the practice. The Supreme Court proclaimed, though not in a patent case,
that “[i]t is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights
validity of a reexamined patent which the district court later finds
invalid. This is essentially what occurs when a court finds a patent
invalid after the PTO has granted it. Once again, it is important that
the district court and the PTO can consider different evidence.
Accordingly, different results between the two forums may be entirely
reasonable. And, if the district court determines a patent is not
invalid, the PTO should continue its reexamination because, of
course, the two forums have different standards for determining
invalidity.
Quigg, 849 F.2d at 1428–29.
168
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“This
Congressional purpose is presumptively correct, and we find that it carries no insult to the
Seventh Amendment and Article III.”).
169
Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 159 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
reexamination, if carried to completion, is likely to result in the cancellation of all of the
claims of the . . . patent. That in turn will require a dismissal of the interfering patents
suit . . . .”).
170
Moffitt v. Garr, 66 U.S. 273, 283 (1861) (“[S]uits pending, which rest upon an act of
Congress, fall with the repeal of it. The reissue of the patent has no connection with or
bearing upon antecedent suits. . . . The antecedent suits depend upon the patent existing
at the time they were commenced, and unless it exists, and is in force at the time of trial
and judgment, the suits fail.”); Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 976 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (“The patentee has no rights [in a non-identical claim] to enforce before the
date of reissue because the original patent was surrendered and is dead.”).
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which have been once vested by a judgment.”171 One hundred
years later, the Federal Circuit warned against reopening final
court decisions based on administrative action.172 Such a system of
overriding the judiciary interferes with courts’ obligation to “render dispositive judgments.”173 Admittedly, while the courts have
announced and maintained the important policy goal that PTO decisions will not alter “final court judgment[s],” they have not unilaterally defined the term; until the court system arrives at a consensus, such proclamations will remain largely inconsistent and
hollow while still providing courts with opportunities to affirm or
vacate infringement findings as desired.174 To that end, Judge
O’Malley of the Federal Circuit avoided using the term “final
judgment” by simply proclaiming that “nothing in either Mendenhall or Simmons suggests that an administrative agency’s actions
can undermine the conclusive resolution of rights by the courts.”175
Regardless of the definition of finality with respect to court
judgments, the reluctance to affect judgments through administrative action stems at least partially from the concern that an alleged
infringer might gain an advantage through the PTO by purposely
burdening another party with the expense of invalidity litigation
171

McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123–24 (1898).
In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1379 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A]n attempt to reopen a
final federal court judgment of infringement on the basis of a reexamination finding of
invalidity might raise constitutional problems.”).
173
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995) (“The record of history
shows that the Framers crafted this charter of the judicial department with an expressed
understanding that it gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases,
but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy—
with an understanding, in short, that “a judgment conclusively resolves the case” because
“a ‘judicial Power’ is one to render dispositive judgments.” By retroactively
commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, Congress has violated this
fundamental principle.” (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990))).
174
See In re Baxter, 698 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]f a federal court awards
relief to a patent holder against an infringer, a subsequent reexamination decision that the
patent is invalid does not alter [that judgment’s] binding effect on the parties [to the
litigation].”); see also Moffitt, 66 U.S. at 283 (“It is a mistake to suppose, that . . . moneys
recovered on judgments in suits . . . might be recovered back [after a patent is cancelled].
The title to these moneys does not depend upon the patent, but upon . . . the judgment of
the court.”).
175
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(O’Malley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
172
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and later invoking an administrative invalidity finding to void the
patent and a judgment of infringement simultaneously.176 However,
this is not a terribly convincing argument because the alleged infringer is usually the defendant in the suit whom the patentee
dragged into court. As such, one who is dragged into court ought to
be able to exercise whatever rights he possesses to remove uncertainty. Similarly, if the patentee is very concerned about his patent
withstanding a validity challenge, he can choose not to sue, or he
may choose to instigate his own reexamination prior to suing.
Though strategic, such litigation tactics imperil the authority of
federal court judgments to protect patent rights,177 in turn diminishing the incentive to innovate and develop new technologies.178
Finally, Federal Circuit judges have raised compelling constitu176

Ultrak Inc. v. Radio Eng’g Indus., Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1530, 1532 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(“Troxel stands for the principle that where a patent licensee does not contest the validity
of the patent, and a third-party who is not a party to the license agreement challenges the
patent’s validity, the licensee cannot avoid royalty payments until such time as the patent
is declared invalid. The same should hold true in the absence of a licensing agreement
where a judgment of infringement is entered. In other words, an alleged infringer cannot
sit back and avoid invalidity litigation costs, but then reap the benefits of another party’s
diligence by retroactively applying the invalidity finding to void the patent ab initio and
void a judgment of infringement. As a result of [the accused infringer’s] proposal, an
alleged infringer “would be more likely to wait for somebody else to battle the issue
because he would have nothing to lose by the delay.” If courts were to follow [the accused
infringer’s] suggestion, the result would be very harmful to the national patent scheme. In
conclusion, “absent fraud or misconduct . . . a patentee should not be held responsible for
the issuance of an invalid patent.” (quoting Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465
F.2d 1253, 1253, 1259 (6th Cir. 1972))).
177
See Fresenius, 733 F.3d at 1381 (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (“Courts will be tempted to
try to limit the time and resources spent on patent cases by seeking an interlocutory
review of their claim construction and liability determinations. In all but those cases
where liability determinations in favor of an alleged infringer are affirmed, however, such
bifurcations will drag out the litigation, causing multiple appeals and probably multiple
remands. Where that occurs, after the panel opinion in this case, even years of litigated
decisions, which may be affirmed piecemeal, could be rendered meaningless by much
later PTO decisions. And, when trial courts come to understand the fragility of their
judgments, stays in the face of reexaminations—which the PTO grants over 92% of the
time—will become inevitable.”).
178
See id. at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The system of patents is founded on
providing an incentive for the creation, development, and commercialization of new
technology. . . . The court has weakened that incentive, by reducing the reliability of the
patent grant, even when the patent has been sustained in litigation. This loss cannot be
underestimated, especially for technologies that incur heavy development costs yet are
readily copied.”).
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tional arguments that vacating federal court judgments based on
reexamination decisions threatens the division of powers.179
5. Stays: Only A Partially Effective Remedy
Sometimes, once parallel reexamination is initiated, a district
court may choose to stay the patent litigation pending the reexamination outcome.180 Though they do not resolve the existing dissonance over the definition of judicial finality, nor the problems inherent in reexaminations initiated after findings of validity and infringement, stays remain helpful tools to avoid abuse with respect
to reexaminations pursued concurrently with litigation,181 and to
that end are advantageous in myriad ways.182 Factors proffered to
179

See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1364–65 (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (“The court’s ruling that PTO reexamination overrides the prior adjudication
of patent validity is contrary to the legislative purposes of reexamination, offensive to
principles of litigation finality and repose, and violative of the Constitution. The judicial
decision of patent validity is not available for review, revision, or annulment by the PTO.
When the issue of patent validity has been litigated and finally decided in the courts, this
binds not only other courts, the parties, and the public; it binds the other branches of
government.”).
180
See, e.g., ASCII Corp. v. STD Entm’t USA, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
181
See id. at 1381 (“[T]here is a liberal policy in favor of granting motions to stay
proceedings pending the outcome of USPTO reexamination or reissue proceedings.”);
Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 159 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (In a stayed
infringement proceeding, “if the [patentee’s] claims were canceled in the reexamination,
[it] would eliminate the need to try the infringement issue.”). By not granting a stay of
infringement proceedings, a court
runs the risk of inconsistent adjudications or issuance of advisory
opinions. . . . Since the court must decide the summary judgment
motions well in advance of trial, it would have to address the
arguments raised before the PTO. Such a situation raises resource
questions. . . . Since the PTO cannot stay the reexamination once a
request has been granted, the court’s issuance of a stay is the only
way to avoid the potential for conflict.
Gioello Enters. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 99-375 GMS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26158, at *3–5
(D. Del. Jan. 29, 2001).
182
Gioello, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26158 at *2–3 (“Numerous courts have cited a
number of advantages of granting a stay pending PTO reexamination: (1) all prior art
presented to the court at trial will have been first considered by the PTO with its
particular expertise, (2) many discovery problems relating to the prior art can be
alleviated, (3) if patent is declared invalid, the suit will likely be dismissed, (4) the
outcome of the reexamination may encourage a settlement without further involvement of
the court, (5) the record of the reexamination would probably be entered at trial, reducing
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assist a court in determining whether to stay infringement litigation
include: “(1) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a
clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party; (2) whether a
stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3)
whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been
set.”183 Though grants and denials of stays have largely paralleled
judicial concerns reflected in the factors about efficiency and prejudice,184 stays have often been granted at the conclusion of discovery.185 Additionally, stays have been granted to alleged infringers
much more frequently than to patent owners, who would logically
derive the greater benefit by avoiding expensive concurrent litiga-

the complexity and the length of the litigation, (6) issues, defenses, and evidence will be
more easily limited in pre-trial conferences and (7) the cost will likely be reduced both for
the parties and the court.”).
183
Xerox Corp. v. 3 Com Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (W.D.N.Y. 1999). See also
Docusign Inc. v. RPost Commc’ns Ltd., No. C13–735–MJP, 2014 WL 2178234, at *1
(W.D. Wash. May 23, 2014) (granting stay of litigation pending reexamination); Bos.
Heart Diagnostics Corp. v. Health Diagnostics Lab., Inc., No. 13–13111–FDS, 2014 WL
2048436, at *1 (D. Mass. May 16, 2014) (granting stay) (“There is a “liberal policy in
favor of granting motions to stay proceedings pending the outcome of reexamination,
especially in cases that are still in the initial stages of litigation and where there has been
little or no discovery.”). But see Carrier Corp. v. Goodman Global, Inc., No. 12–930–SLR,
2014 WL 2042470 (D. Del. May 8, 2014) (denying stay of litigation pending
reexamination).
184
See, e.g., Freeman v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 661 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D. Del. 1987)
(holding that stay was inappropriate where discovery was concluded and a grant of stay
would allow the alleged infringer to use reexamination purely as a dilatory tactic); Digital
Magnetic Sys. v. Ansley, 213 U.S.P.Q. 290, 290 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (denying motion for
stay where reexamination proceeding was initiated after close of discovery and PTO had
not yet ruled on reexamination request); Enprotech Corp. v. Autotech Corp., 15
U.S.P.Q.2d 1319, 1320 (denying patentee’s motion for stay where discovery was almost
complete and reexamination would not resolve issues of patentee’s alleged inequitable
conduct); Gladish v. Tyco Toys, Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1718, 1720 (denying patentee’s
motion for stay where stay would prejudice defendant in its ability to continue discovery
on prior use issue); Target Therapeutics Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys. Inc., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
2022, 2024 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (granting stay where litigation was at early stages).
185
See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 951, 953 (granting
stay even though reexamination request had been filed by non-party to litigation at a point
when discovery had substantially progressed). Stays have been granted even when the
movant is a party and considerable litigation discovery has been completed. Grayling
Indus. v. GPAC Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872, 1874 (N.D. Ga. 1991); Emhart Indus. Inc. v.
Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889, 1892 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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tion expenses.186 Only through greater uniformity in courts’ ruling
on stays will their effectiveness and reliability increase.
C. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60
If the various aforementioned justifications to permit vacating
judgments do not persuade critics of the practice, then does such
authority exist elsewhere in the law, albeit in a less explored area?
Three distinct options drawn from within Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 59 and 60 may prove dispositive.187 But as shall be seen,
none indisputably allow the defendant to vacate the judgment.
1. Newly Discovered Evidence Under Rule 59(a)
Rule 59(a) provides the authority for a federal court to set aside
a verdict and order a new trial,188 but only “when the verdict is
against the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence
which is false, or will result in a clear miscarriage of justice.”189
The moving party must be “unfairly made the victim of surprise . . . inconsistent with substantial justice.”190 Though the Rule
does not specify the standards for granting a new trial based on new
evidence, courts have set forth elements or factors to determine
when to grant a motion.191 The circumstances that have necessi186

Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 80 n.350 (1997) (“Stays are
generally granted when sought by alleged infringers at a reasonably early stage in the
litigation, whereas stays are generally denied when sought by patent owner plaintiffs,
irrespective of the stage of the litigation.”).
187
FED. R. CIV. P. 59, 60.
188
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a) (“The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of
the issues—and as to any party—as follows: (A) after a jury trial, for any reason for which
a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court; or (B) after a
nonjury trial, for any reason for which a rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in
equity in federal court.”).
189
Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 780 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Torres–Troche v.
Municipality of Yauco, 873 F.2d 499 (1st Cir.1989)).
190
Perez-Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 1993).
191
Buell v. Sec. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 784 F. Supp. 1533, 1536 (D. Colo. 1992), aff’d, 987
F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A] court should consider, among other things, the reasons
for the moving party’s default, the importance of the omitted evidence to the moving
party’s case, whether the evidence was available to the non-movant before responding to
the summary judgment motion, and the likelihood that the nonmoving party will suffer
unfair prejudice if the case is reopened.”). A party seeking to supplement its motion with
new evidence must show either that: “(a) the evidence is newly discovered, or (2) if the
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tated new trials based on newly discovered evidence are limited;192
they encompass evidence not available at the time of ruling on an
issue,193 evidence on an issue the parties did not previously anticipate being relevant to disposition,194 or evidence apparently intentionally withheld until, and only discovered after, a motion or response was filed.195
None of these situations parallels those in which an alleged infringer seizes the opportunity to use evidence to invalidate patent
evidence was available . . . [previously], that counsel made a diligent though unsuccessful
attempt to discover the evidence.” In re Sun Healthcare Grp., Inc., 214 F.R.D. 671, 673
(D.N.M. 2003) (alteration in original). The Federal Circuit has explained,
Rule 59(a) does not explicitly discuss the standards for granting or
denying a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
Instead, it permits the grant of a new trial “for any of the reasons for
which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the
courts of the United States.” We have applied specific rules
governing when a court may grant a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence.
Colon-Millin v. Sears Roebuck De P.R., Inc., 455 F.3d 30, 36 n.4 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted). The court cited the First Circuit’s Acosta-Mestre holding for the requisite rule
elements, in which it stated,
To warrant granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence,
the movant must demonstrate that (1) the evidence has been
discovered since trial; (2) the evidence could not by due diligence
have been discovered earlier; (3) the evidence is not merely
cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such a nature
that it would probably change the result if a new trial is granted.
Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton Int’l of P.R., Inc., 156 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 1998).
192
See Goland v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“The
occasions when newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances will warrant setting
aside a final judgment are limited procedurally as well as substantively.”).
193
See e.g., Bell v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cnty., 451 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th
Cir. 2006) (finding that evidence of settlement agreement between former county
employee and county qualified as newly discovered evidence for the purpose of the
terminated employee’s renewed application for attorney fees to alter or amend the prior
judgment, because the settlement was evidence not available at the time of the initial
ruling on attorney fees).
194
See e.g., Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that records were
newly discovered evidence where parties did not, prior to the hearing, foresee that the
issue would be relevant and were not given an opportunity to collect evidence).
195
E.g., McClendon v. B & H Servs., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 364, 366 (E.D. Tenn. 1995)
(concluding that a job order was newly discovered evidence, as would support a motion to
alter or amend the judgment in employee’s Fair Labor Standards Act claim against
employer, where the job order was received after the employee filed his response to the
employer’s summary judgment motion).
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claims during a reexamination decision following a judgment of validity and infringement. Evidence that is not newly discovered cannot support a motion under Rule 59(a).196 Courts invariably deny
motions when the evidence proffered with the motion adds no new
proof197 or was readily available to the movant before the decision
in the judicial proceedings.198
One could quibble over just what the term “new evidence”
might mean in the reexamination context. If the reexamination
knocked out the patent on evidence (such as prior art) that was not
part of the prior litigation, then perhaps a court might be persuaded
that the entire reexamination proceeding and facts adjudicated
therein qualify as new evidence for the purposes of Rule 59(a).
Perhaps the prior art in the reexamination is not new per se, but
still results in the cancelation of the relevant claims. The defendant
may argue that, although the prior art itself is not new, the fact that
the claims are now canceled is new evidence for the purposes of
Rule 59(a). A later reexamination determination of claim cancelation is certainly “new” in view of the earlier court judgment and by
definition could not have been raised earlier.

196
Pavlik v. Lane Ltd./Tobacco Exporters Int’l, 135 F.3d 876, 882 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998)
(“[W]hen evidence is not newly discovered, a party may not submit that evidence in
support of a motion to reconsider . . . .”).
197
See, e.g., Williams v. Hobbs, 658 F.3d 842, 853 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
inmates’ new evidence did not warrant a vacatur of judgment dismissing their action
because such new evidence did not add anything concrete to the evidence provided in the
inmates’ complaint); Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 947 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C.
2013) (finding that the evidence proffered by a Kenyan refugee on a motion to alter or
amend judgment did not constitute new evidence because the motion raised no facts
previously unknown to him and mostly repeated information in the first amended
complaint).
198
See, e.g., Montgomery v. Bagley, 581 F.3d 440, 452 (6th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc
granted, vacated (Jan. 21, 2010) (concluding that affidavits did not qualify as newly
discovered evidence nor support the state’s motion to alter or amend the judgment
granting the habeas petition, because the affiants still lived in the area, the information in
the police report could have been used to locate the affiant, the police made no effort to
determine the veracity of the report despite notice, and the affidavits were readily
discoverable at the time of the initial trial, at the time the habeas petition was filed, and
long before the writ was issued); ICEE Distribs., Inc. v. J&J Snack Foods Corp., 445 F.3d
841, 848 (5th Cir. 2006) (refusing to reconsider summary judgment despite new evidence
calling into doubt the validity of the defendant’s license because the evidence in question
had been available or easily discoverable before summary judgment).
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2. Void Judgment
Rule 60(b)(4) provides for grounds for relief from a void judgment,199 based on the basic Supreme Court tenet that “[f]ederal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”200 Parties may bring Rule
60(b) motions even after final judgment has been entered,201 and
deciding such a motion on a judgment entered absent proper subject matter jurisdiction can be challenging,202 because it raises opposing policy concerns.203 Similarly, a court must rule that a judgment entered absent proper personal jurisdiction is void.204 Invariably, the judgment must suffer a “fundamental infirmity,”205 a requirement that is substantiated when a court was “powerless to
enter it.”206 Thus, Rule 60(b)(4) provides a very narrow remedy.207
199

FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4). (“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party
or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void.”). Because “a void judgment is a legal nullity, it
may be challenged not only directly but also by collateral attack in a proceeding in any
court where that judgment’s validity comes in issue.” Graciette v. Star Guidance, Inc., 66
F.R.D. 424, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
200
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
201
Fafel v. Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 414 (1st Cir. 2005) (“If an offer of judgment is
accepted and judgment entered, a court may still be called upon . . . to decide a motion
brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the . . . judgment.”).
202
See id. at 410 (“[D]etermining when a judgment rendered in the absence of subjectmatter jurisdiction is ‘void’ for purposes of collateral attack is an issue of some
complexity.”).
203
See Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 822, 826 (8th Cir.
1980) (“Competing policies are at stake in setting aside a federal court judgment as void
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: observation of limits on federal jurisdiction and
need for judgments that are final.”).
204
See Nature’s First Inc. v. Nature’s First Law, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 368, 372 (D.
Conn. 2006) (“A default judgment entered against a party not subject to the district
court’s personal jurisdiction is a nullity, or is ‘void.’ . . . . Accordingly, a default judgment
obtained by way of defective service is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and must be
set aside as a matter of law.”). Motions under this subsection of the Rule “leave no
margin for consideration of the district court’s discretion as the judgments themselves are
by definition either legal nullities or not.” Baragona v. Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co.,
691 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2009). However, “a court has discretion . . . to decline
to vacate a merely voidable judgment.” Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 68 F.R.D.
686, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
205
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010) (“[T]he
infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final.”).
206
Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Combs v. Nick
Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). A court is powerless “[i]f the
underlying judgment is void because the court lacked personal or subject matter
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Because the federal courts have original jurisdiction over patent
infringement lawsuits,208 and provided that the court has proper
personal jurisdiction and venue, a final judgment of validity and
infringement is not void simply because it is adverse to a defendant’s interests. Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide an appropriate basis to vacate a final patent validity judgment based on a subsequent
decision.209
But again the argument could be made that, if indeed a patent
canceled through reexamination means that the patent was void ab
initio, then perhaps it qualifies to void the judgment through Rule
60(b)(4). It stands to reason that, if the judgment is not void, then
the judgment has enforcement and that the enforcement includes
the right to exclude others from infringing the patent.210 But the
effect of the canceled patent is that the patent no longer confers
any enforceable rights. There is no right to exclude anymore. As
such, the effect of the canceled patent might be that the court
lacked initial subject matter jurisdiction, which is an express
ground under Rule 60(b) to void the judgment.211 It does not seem
fair that if the defendant shows that the patent is void ab initio, that
judgments built upon that non-existent patent are not equally void.
jurisdiction or because the entry of the order violated the due process rights of the
respondent.” Textile Banking Co., Inc. v. Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 1981).
Only rarely, when there is “clear usurpation of power will a judgment be rendered void.”
Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972).
207
V. T. A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 225 (10th Cir. 1979) (“In the interest of
finality, the concept of setting aside a judgment on voidness grounds is narrowly
constricted.”). Courts “narrowly construe the concept of a ‘void’ order under Rule
60(b)(4) precisely because of the threat to finality of judgments and the risk that
litigants . . . will use Rule 60(b)(4) to circumvent an appeal process they elected not to
follow.” Wendt v. Leonard, 431 F.3d 410, 412 (4th Cir. 2005). A motion that “the
judgment is void is not a substitute for a timely appeal.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270–71.
Additionally, “[a] judgment is not void . . . simply because it is or may have been
erroneous.” Id. at 270 (quoting Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995)). “Only when
the jurisdictional error is ‘egregious’ will courts treat the judgment as void.” United
States v. Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 2000).
208
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012).
209
See V. T. A., 597 F.2d at 225 (denying petitioners’ 60(b)(4) motion and finding that
the court had jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter in the decree
proceeding).
210
35 U.S.C. § 283 (regarding injunction); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (regarding factors to consider in injunctions).
211
See V. T. A., 597 F.2d at 224.
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3. The Catchall Provision: Any Other Grounds Justifying
Relief
Rule 60(b)(6) provides relief that may only be granted for “exceptional or extraordinary circumstances.”212 The change in circumstances warranting relief “must have been unforeseen.”213 The
Rule vests courts with “equitable power to do justice” but not
“standardless residual discretionary power to set aside judgments.”214 In fact, the Federal Circuit has denied a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion where a defendant was “aware of the prior art upon which
its reexamination petition was based well before trial, [but] failed to
file the reexamination petition until after the unfavorable judgment
was entered.”215 A favorable subsequent reexamination decision
may not constitute “any other reason that justifies relief.”216 Or
does it?
As we suggested earlier, a canceled patent is considered void ab
initio. It never existed. Anyone affected by the patent is now out
from under the patent. Previously enjoined defendants are no longer harmed by the patent.217

212

Louisville Bedding Co. v. Pillowtex Corp., 455 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
McCray v. Dawson, 953 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (“[A]lthough the change in
circumstances need not have been unforeseeable.”).
214
Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of V.I., 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is
improper to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) if the aggrieved party could have reasonably
sought the same relief by means of appeal.”). Furthermore, “[i]f a party makes a
conscious and informed choice of litigation strategy, he cannot seek extraordinary relief
merely because his assessment of the consequences was incorrect.” In re Master Key
Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. 460, 464 (D. Conn. 1977), aff’d, 580 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1978).
215
Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
216
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
217
While an aggressive defendant may view the final cancelation of a patent to
automatically lift any injunction, that defendant may not consider the renewed conduct to
constitute infringement or contempt of an injunction. A more conservative defendant
may choose to petition a court to formally remove the injunction so that there is no issue
of contempt of court process. We do not opine on which is the right course of action.
Though in the pharmaceutical drug context, a prior losing defendant (usually a generic
drug company) might need to petition the court to lift the injuction against itself and the
injunction that is lodged against the FDA from approving the generic drug dossier. See 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A). See also UPADHYE, supra note 65, §§ 16:3, 16:4.
213
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D. Collateral Attack
If the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguably do not provide
the authoritative basis for subsequently vacating a final judgment of
validity and infringement, perhaps the collateral attack doctrine
offers a defendant such an opportunity. Given that reexaminations
and infringement litigation can proceed concurrently, collateral attack would seem the rational choice for a defendant, as it is “an
action with an independent purpose and contemplative of another
form of relief that depends on the overruling of a prior judgment.”218 However, policy concerns generally foreclose the opportunity for collateral attack of even unjust decisions.219 Even if afforded the opportunity for collateral attack, “the court will presume that all proceedings in the original action necessary to sustain
the validity of the judgment, were regular.”220 The party collaterally attacking the judgment must rebut the presumption of validity.221
Courts have explicitly indicated that appellate review constitutes
the appropriate method of challenging civil judgments.222

218

Popp Telcom v. Am. Sharecom, Inc., 210 F.3d 928, 941 (8th Cir. 2000).
Fuller v. Vanwagoner, 49 F. Supp. 281, 283 (E.D. Mich. 1942) (“[A] decree or
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked even where
the records show that the decree was an unjust one.”); see also Bell v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 214 F.3d 798, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ollateral attack, especially in civil cases, is
disfavored because of the social interest in expedition and finality in litigation.”).
220
Pen-Ken Gas & Oil Corp. v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 137 F.2d 871, 879 (6th Cir.
1943); see also Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 550 F. Supp. 681, 684 (W.D. Okla. 1980)
(“[T]here is a presumption in favor of the validity of the judgment and the existence of all
necessary jurisdictional facts.”).
221
See United States v. City of McAlester, Okla., 410 F. Supp. 848, 853 (E.D. Okla.
1976) (“[T]he burden is upon the party collaterally attacking a judgment to overcome the
presumptions and establish the invalidity of a judgment by competent and convincing
proof.”); see also Kenner v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 387 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir.
1968) (“[T]here is a heavy burden both of particularized pleading and of proof upon the
one who seeks to impeach an order or decree of a court. There must be an offer to prove
specific facts which will pretty plainly impugn the official record.”).
222
See Clark v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 2d 763, 772 (N.D. Ohio
2013) (“There is a firm and long-standing principle that final judgments are meant to be
just that—final. Subject to only rare exceptions, direct attacks, i.e., appeals, by parties to
the litigation, are the primary way that a civil judgment is challenged.”).
219
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E. Ending Litigation
Federal courts rely on the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel to finally terminate litigation.223 However, analysis of
the requirements to bar subsequent litigation under these doctrines
might reveal an exception through which one may legitimately vacate a patent validity judgment through reexamination.
1. Res Judicata
Res judicata stems from the ideology that “[a] party who once
has had a chance to litigate a claim before an appropriate tribunal
usually ought not to have another chance to do so.”224 The doctrine may be pleaded as “a bar, not only as respects matters actually presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted in the earlier
proceeding, ‘but also as respects any other available matter which
might have been presented to that end.’”225 Different circuits have
delineated comparable elements required to bar subsequent litigation under res judicata, but the bar generally proscribes the same
parties from arguing the same claim already finally decided.226
Concurrent litigation of the same claims in different jurisdictions is
not precluded,227 and equity provides for a variety of direct excep223
See Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (“[T]here must be some end to
litigation and . . . when one appears in court to present his case, is fully heard, and the
contested issue is decided against him, he may not later renew the litigation in another
court.”).
224
SBC Commc’ns Inc. v. F.C.C., 407 F.3d 1223, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also C.I.R.
v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (“The general rule of res judicata applies to
repetitious suits involving the same cause of action. It rests upon considerations of
economy of judicial time and public policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal
relations.”); Carson v. Dep’t of Energy, 398 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The
doctrine ‘serves to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve
judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on
adjudication.’”).
225
Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378 (1940) (quoting
Grubb v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 480 (1930)).
226
See EDP Med. Computer Sys., Inc. v. United States, 480 F.3d 621, 624 (2d Cir.
2007) (“The doctrine bars later litigation if [an] earlier decision was (1) a final judgment
on the merits, (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a case involving the same
parties or their privies, and (4) involving the same cause of action.”).
227
Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 916 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[P]arallel
proceedings . . . pending in different jurisdictions . . . can proceed, but the judgment in the
first case in which a final judgment on the merits is entered will be res judicata in the
other suit if the other requirements for res judiciata . . . are satisfied.”).
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tions.228 However, these exceptions do not necessarily encompass
cases remanded for certain issues.229 Res judicata would therefore
preclude a defendant who unsuccessfully counterclaimed invalidity
in infringement litigation from subsequently asserting a reexamination finding of invalidity to vacate judgment.
2. Collateral Estoppel
A prior judgment typically precludes any relitigating of an issue
of fact or law previously resolved by a valid court and necessary to
the prior judgment.230 Implementation of the doctrine intends to
promote efficiency and avoid inconsistent decisions.231 Interesting228

See Hayes v. City of Chi., 670 F.3d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 2012). The six scenarios under
which it would be inequitable to apply res judicata are:
(1) the parties have agreed in terms or in effect that plaintiff may split
his claim or the defendant has acquiesced therein; (2) the court in the
first action expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the
second action; (3) the plaintiff was unable to obtain relief on his claim
because of a restriction on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court
in the first action; (4) the judgment in the first action was plainly
inconsistent with the equitable implementation of a statutory scheme;
(5) the case involves a continuing or recurrent wrong; or (6) it is
clearly and convincingly shown that the policies favoring preclusion
of a second action are overcome for an extraordinary reason.
Id. Additionally, “[t]here is no general public policy exception to the operation of res
judicata.” Apotex, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 393 F.3d 210, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
229
See Bullen v. De Bretteville, 239 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1956) (“The fact that
several questions were deferred for later decision does not render the doctrine of res
judicata inapplicable. A case remanded for further hearing or over which jurisdiction is
retained for some purposes may nonetheless be final as to other issues determined.”).
230
See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748–49 (2001) (“Issue preclusion
generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of an
issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential
to the prior judgment, whether or not the issue arises on the same or a different claim.”);
see also In re King, 500 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (“Generally, the proponent
of . . . collateral estoppel must show that (1) a question of fact essential to the judgment
was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) the same parties
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) there was mutuality of
estoppel.”).
231
See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (“Collateral
estoppel . . . has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an
identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by
preventing needless litigation.”) see also Action Ink, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 959 F.
Supp. 2d 934, 943 (E.D. La. 2013) (“[O]ne of the purposes of the doctrine is to avoid
inconsistent decisions—a purpose that could not very well be achieved if the second court
were entitled to reexamine the conclusions of the first to determine their correctness.”).
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ly, collateral estoppel can be preclusive to fully litigated issues even
prior to final judgment in an action, offering another perspective on
the definition of judicial finality that we have previously contemplated.232 Conclusively litigating patent claim validity and infringement thus precludes revisiting them under collateral estoppel
even if no final judgment has been entered, suggesting that a defendant’s only recourse is appeal, not assertion of a reexamination
decision.
IV.

A CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN THE MAKING? A
FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS ISSUE
We see a problem afoot in the reexamination context. If the
posture of the case is akin to Fresenius, where liability was conclusively established in court, but the remedies portion was still in
suit, the case is still not final. Yet, a parallel reexamination that
wipes out the patent may implicate a Fifth Amendment due
process issue. That is, if the patentee has conclusively earned the
liability ruling, it has in effect earned the final judgment as to that
liability. If the PTO invalidates the patent claim and the trial court
seeks to dismiss the case, is that not in effect taking a property right
(the final liability judgment) from the patentee without any recourse? Said another way, does a patentee have a vested right in
the final liability judgment, irrespective of whatever other parts of
the case are still pending?233
232

See Henglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 260 F.3d 201, 209–210 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“[F]inality for purposes of issue preclusion is a more ‘pliant’ concept than it would be in
other contexts.”); Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 1999); Swentek v.
USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 561 (4th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds (“Finality for
purposes of collateral estoppel is a flexible concept.”); Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 1979) (“To be ‘final’ for purposes of
collateral estoppel the decision need only be immune, as a practical matter, to reversal or
amendment. ‘Finality’ in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is not required.”); Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir. 1964) (“[C]ollateral
estoppel does not require a judgment which ends the litigation and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment, but includes many dispositions which, though not
final in that sense, have nevertheless been fully litigated.”).
233
See, e.g., Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113
(1948) (“[j]udgments within the powers vested in [Article III] courts . . . may not be
unlawfully revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of
Government”); Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603 (1923) (“the private rights of
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A nuanced approach to this argument may flow from the vested
right to the liability judgment. If the patentee has earned a vested
property right in the liability judgment, then it stands to reason that
he has also earned the consequences or rewards to that judgment.
In other words, the current reexamination regime wipes out the
damages because the patent cancelation occurs during the case itself (i.e., because there is no final judgment). On the other hand,
under this nuanced approach, the patentee is not arguing that his
entitlement to damages flows from the fact that finality has been
achieved, but rather flows from his entitlement to the rewards of
owning a property right in the liability judgment.
The danger of basing the damages on the property right in the
judgment is that the Supreme Court has also stated that property
rights may be expropriated (i.e., “taken”) for public purposes.234 In
Kelo v. City of New London, the Court permitted the taking of private property for a public purpose (as opposed to a public use), and
accordingly, a court could still wipe out the judgment under some
public purpose; the public purpose of removing liability for infringing a patent was found to be invalid.235
V. THE OBVIOUS REMEDY—CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO
LIMIT THE EFFECT OF REEXAMINATION
As described herein, there is no constitutional problem with the
PTO canceling a claim during a reexamination and having the paparties which have been vested by the judgment of a court cannot be taken away by
subsequent legislation, but must be thereafter enforced by the court regardless of such
legislation”); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1899) (“it is undoubtedly
true that legislatures cannot set aside the judgments of courts”); United States v.
O’Grady, 89 U.S. 641, 647–48 (1874) (invalidating attempt by Congress to revise a final
judgment entered by the Court of Claims because, “where no appeal is taken to [Supreme
Court], [such judgments] are, under existing laws, absolutely conclusive of the rights of
the parties, unless a new trial is granted by [Claims] court”); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 431 (1855) (“[an] act of congress cannot have the effect
and operation to annul the judgment of the court already rendered, or the rights
determined thereby”); Massingill v. Downs, 48 U.S 760, 768 (1849) (“no legislative act
can change the rights and liabilities of parties which have been established by solemn
judgment”).
234
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496–97 (2005).
235
Id. at 489.
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rallel court dismiss the lawsuit so long as any aspect of the lawsuit
is still pending.236 A first obvious remedy is to have Congress step
in and legislate (versus judicial intervention) the scope and effect of
a reexamination. Legislation would need to be carefully worded to
avoid a potential separation of powers problem. Legislation may be
crafted that either requires a court to dismiss an action, or may
more subtly remove the case by stating that in the event of a canceled claim, the parallel no longer possesses jurisdiction. There are
ways to craft the law so as to avoid having the law tell the courts
what to do.
In a congressional fix to reexaminations, Congress stepped in to
overrule the In re Portola Packing case.237 There, the question raised
was, what is a substantial “new” question of patentability?238 The
Federal Circuit held that a “new” question was one that the PTO
had not previously considered.239 As such, reexaminations could
only be predicated on really “new” questions that used new art not
considered by the PTO before.240 Congress stepped in and legislatively overruled Portola Packaging and allowed for new questions to
be raised even when the PTO had considered the prior art previously.241
VI. A PRACTICAL REMEDY—SPEEDY LITIGATIONS
We see from the above discussion that litigants are faced with a
dilemma. The dilemma is one of speed versus cost and efficiency.
A patentee, in its best interest, should try to achieve final judgment
on the patent litigation side prior to resolution of a co-pending
reexamination.242 So, it behooves a patentee to litigate a case in its
entirety as quickly as possible. As such, the patentee will litigate
236

See infra notes 244–51 and accompanying text.
In re Portola Packaging, 110 F.3d 786, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
238
Id. at 788.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.; see also In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing
history of Portola Packaging and the congressional overrides).
242
See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(“[W]hen a claim is cancelled, the patentee loses any cause of action based on that claim,
and any pending litigation in which the claims are asserted becomes moot”).
237
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both the liability and damages portions together. However, litigating the case entirely is costly and resource-intensive. Moreover, the
district court may not stay a co-pending litigation, thereby making
it costly and inefficient to prosecute a litigation and defend against
a reexamination simultaneously.243
A defendant, on the other hand, may seek to bifurcate liability
from damages and remedies.244 For the defendant, it is more efficient and speedy to bifurcate the case under the theory that it is
pointless to adjudicate remedies and damages if in fact there is no
liability.245 There is also the tactical advantage that, until there is
some finality, the defendant has time to prosecute a co-pending
reexamination to expunge the patent. A defendant may also instigate an early reexamination and seek a stay of the co-pending litigation, thereby arguing to the judge that scarce judicial resources are
conserved and the PTO expertise on the patent’s validity will result in a better outcome.
We believe that the proper resolution is that a patentee is the
master of its lawsuit and, as an instigator of the suit, must suffer the
consequences of potential time delays caused by bifurcation and/or
a stay of district court litigation. The patentee chose to bring suit
and subject the defendant to suit. To this end, the defendant is entitled to exercise whatever rights it has to stay litigation, seek bifurcation that undoubtedly results in delay, and institute a reexamination to knock out the patent.246
243

See Robert Bosch Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Cardiocom, LLC, No. C-14-1575 EMC,
2014 WL 3107447, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2014) (“A court may grant a stay ‘in order to
avoid inconsistent results, narrow the issues, obtain guidance from the PTO, or simply to
avoid the needless waste of judicial resources, especially if the evidence suggests that the
patents-in-suit will not survive reexamination.’”).
244
See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). See also Real v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 620
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Bifurcation in patent cases, as in others, is the exception, not the
rule.”); Remcor Prods. Co. v. Servend Int’l Inc., No. 93-C-1823, 1994 WL 594723 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 28, 1994); THK Am. Inc. v. NSK Co. Ltd., 151 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Ill.1993);
Kimberly–Clark Corp. v. James River Corp. of Va., 131 F.R.D. 607, 608 (N.D. Ga.1989);
Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 791 F.Supp. 113, 114 (E.D. La.1992) (“[C]ourts
should not order separate trials unless such a disposition is clearly necessary.”).
245
See Remcor Prods. Co., 1994 WL 594723, at *1.
246
It is not unfair for a party to avail itself of any statutory remedy it has that Congress
intended it to have. See Parmenter v. Wal Mart Stores, E., L.P., No. 3:06CV1585 PCD,
2007 WL 2071625 (D. Conn. 2007) (“Rather, where there is a statutory remedy
addressing the public policy at issue, courts should adhere to the statutory remedial
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We also believe that the system, as it exists, is sufficient to protect the rights of patentees. If the patentee escapes reexamination
with claims intact, then liability is further established. Furthermore, though not binding on a trial court, we imagine that a patent
that escapes reexamination will be shrouded by even greater protection by the trial court.
VII.

THE EFFECT OF PARALLEL REEXAMINATION IN
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LITIGATION
Parallel reexamination may impact the unique world of Hatch–
Waxman Act brand-generic drug patent litigation.247 The Hatch–
Waxman Act is very complicated, as it creates a prospective patent
litigation consequence.248 In this context, the generic drug company usually develops the generic drug version in view of various
brand company patents. Usually, when the generic drug company
files its generic drug dossier with the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), it will certify to the FDA that one or more patents
in question are not an obstacle to FDA approval of the dossier.249
Later, the generic drug company must notify the brand company
that the dossier has been filed and certifications to various patents
have been lodged.250 This allows the brand company to sue the generic company for patent infringement.251 The lawsuit to vet out
scheme dictated by the legislature, since ‘we can presume that the legislature would have
provided additional relief in the statute if it thought it necessary.’”).
247
The Hatch–Waxman Act is the name commonly used to refer to the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360(cc) (2000), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)),
amended by Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
248
See Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“In order to bring about early resolution of patent disputes between generics and
pioneering drug companies, the Act provides that the filing of a Paragraph IV
Certification is an act of patent infringement.”).
249
UPADHYE, supra note 65, § 10:5.
250
Id.
251
See Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1356 (“For Paragraph IV ANDAs, the timing of approval
depends upon two events: (1) whether the pioneer drug company brings an infringement
action within 45 days of learning of the Paragraph IV ANDA filing, and (2) whether the
company seeking approval was the first one to file an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV
Certification to a listed patent.”).
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the patent issues runs parallel to the FDA approval process.252 If
the patentee wins the lawsuit, then the FDA is forbidden from approving the dossier until the underlying patent expires.253 If the patentee loses, then the generic company may obtain final dossier approval and launch the product. The launch of the generic drug
product prior to ultimate final resolution may cause serious market
damage to the brand company and subject the generic company to
significant patent damages.254 Accordingly, to maximize its ability
to market the drug and to minimize the risk of damage, the generic
drug company needs to win.
In the first instance, the generic drug company can instigate a
reexamination prior to filing the generic drug dossier. The benefits
of instigating and/or concluding a reexamination include not having to certify the patent later and litigate a patent.255 If the patent is
252

See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“If the
patentee files an infringement action within the designated 45-day period, the FDA may
not approve the ANDA until 30 months have passed, unless the case is decided before
then or the 30–month period is modified by the court before which the infringement
action is pending.”).
253
See UPADHYE, supra note 65, § 16:3; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A) (2012) (“(4)
For an act of infringement described in paragraph (2)— (A) the court shall order the
effective date of any approval of the drug or veterinary biological product involved in the
infringement to be a date which is not earlier than the date of the expiration of the patent
which has been infringed.”).
254
See, e.g., Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA, 748
F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming patent validity) (“Trial was to a jury.
Glenmark admitted infringement, and the jury held that the ′244 patent had not been
proved invalid. The jury awarded $15,200,000 in lost profits and $803,514 in price
erosion damages.”); Astrazeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 985 F. Supp. 2d 452, 460
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (“This Opinion concludes that Astra is entitled to a reasonable
royalty for Apotex’s infringement of the Patents in the amount of 50% of Apotex’s profits
on its infringing sales or $76,021,994.50, plus pre-judgment interest.”).
255
If the patent is cancelled such that no claim remains in the patent for which the
brand drug product is claimed, then the patentee must delist the patent. 21 U.S.C. §
355(b)(1)(G) (“The applicant shall file with the application the patent number and the
expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the
application or which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to which a
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug. If an application is filed under
this subsection for a drug and a patent which claims such drug or a method of using such
drug is issued after the filing date but before approval of the application, the applicant
shall amend the application to include the information required by the preceding
sentence. Upon approval of the application, the Secretary shall publish information
submitted under the two preceding sentences.”).
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broad, a reexamination may nullify or narrow the patent sufficiently
so as to guide the development and avoid patent liability.256 The
drawback is that, by nullifying or narrowing the patent, it may allow
competitor generic companies to free ride on the efforts of the instigating company. Accordingly, there is a free-rider problem,
though the consumers at large benefit from increased competition.257
A second instance where reexamination may prove useful is
when Paragraph IV litigation just starts. As discussed above, a district court judge may choose to stay any co-pending litigation in
favor of the co-pending reexamination.258 Because the district court
uses the heightened standard of invalidity (i.e., clear and convincing evidence), conceivably it is “easier” to invalidate the claims in
reexamination because of the lower thresholds at the PTO.259 Ac256
See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“In a very real sense,
the intent underlying reexamination is to ‘start over’ in the PTO with respect to the
limited examination areas involved, and to re examine the claims, and to examine new or
amended claims, as they would have been considered if they had been originally examined
in light of all of the prior art of record in the reexamination proceeding.”).
257
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., CIV. 02-1512-SLR, 2008 WL 4809116, at *2
(D. Del. Nov. 5, 2008) (“I am not persuaded by the case law defendants cite for the
proposition that the prevention of ‘free riding’ is a legitimate business justification.
Indeed, the Hatch–Waxman Act establishes and condones the opposite proposition, the
‘piggybacking’ of generics. Based on the reasoning of such cases as SmithKline Beecham
Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F.Supp.2d 1011 (N.D.Ill.2003), if defendants present their ‘free
riding’ argument, I will include an instruction that such conduct is lawful.”) (citing
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1051–52 (N.D. Ill.
2003), aff’d, 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), opinion vacated on reh’g en banc, 403 F.3d
1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005), superseded, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005), aff’d on other grounds,
403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“SmithKline points out that Apotex wants to take a free
ride (“usurping,” SmithKline calls it) on the considerable investment made by
SmithKline in obtaining FDA approval for Paxil. It is indeed much easier to establish
bioequivalence than it is to convince the FDA that an original drug is safe and effective.
But that kind of free riding the law permits, and indeed the Hatch–Waxman Act
encourages. Moreover, free riding is an integral part of the scheme of the patent law. In
exchange for the exclusive and in the case of Paxil very valuable rights that a valid patent
grants, the patentee is required to make public disclosure of the steps required to create
the patented product, so that when the patent expires and the patented product enters the
public domain competitors can manufacture the product. Those competitors are free
riders with a vengeance. But they are lawful free riders. And so is Apotex.”)).
258
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
259
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (“A prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim pending in a
reexamination proceeding is established when the information compels a conclusion that
a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard,
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cordingly, because of the speed associated with the reexamination,
it may be that the PTO nullifies the challenged patent whilst the
litigation is stayed. When the PTO nullifies the patent (or the Federal Circuit after appeal affirms the invalidity), the generic drug
company will then domesticate the reexamination verdict into the
district court process. Once the district court enters judgment, any
residual 30-month litigation stay will be terminated and, if the generic drug dossier is in a condition of approval, then the dossier will
be finally approved.260 Therefore, the reexamination pathway provides for the ability to avoid a co-pending litigation before a district
court.261
A third instance where reexamination may prove beneficial is
the avoidance of parallel district court litigation in which the court
has already adjudicated the patent validity. For example, suppose
the brand drug company has already sued generic company #1 and
won. Under the rules, therefore, the generic company #1’s generic
drug dossier cannot be approved until the relevant patent expires.262
Generic drug company #2 may wish to challenge the patent,
but would know that the brand company is likely to sue company
#2 in the very same court and preferably the very same judge as
before. The likelihood that #2 will prevail where #1 failed is low, so
#2 decides to file a reexamination without provoking the district
court litigation. To do so, #2 may choose to file the generic drug
dossier with a so-called Paragraph III Certification to the relevant
patent.263 This means that the dossier will be substantively reviewed by the FDA, but the brand drug company neither knows
giving each term it’s broadest possible construction consistent with the
specification . . . .”).
260
The 30-month litigation stay expires with a district court judgment that the patent is
no longer considered blocking. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
261
See, e.g., Amneal Pharms. LLC v. Supernus Pharms., Inc., IPR 2013-00368, IPR
2013-00371, & IPR 2013-00372 (P.T.A.B.). Here, Amneal was not the first generic
company to challenge the patents.
262
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A) (2012) (“(4) For an act of infringement described in
paragraph (2)—(A) the court shall order the effective date of any approval of the drug or
veterinary biological product involved in the infringement to be a date which is not earlier
than the date of the expiration of the patent which has been infringed.”).
263
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1285 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
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about the pending dossier nor can institute suit (because the company did not file a Paragraph IV Certification to instigate suit).
By instigating a reexamination instead of challenging the patent
in court, the generic drug company #2 may utilize the exact same
prior art that the district court previously vetted to invalidate the
patent.264 Moreover, because of the limited discovery allowed, the
costs are significantly cheaper.265 In addition, the invalidation of
the patent in reexamination coupled with the termination of the
district court case may dislodge company #1 to earn dossier approval and launch the product. In essence, if company #1 has the
so-called 180-Day Exclusivity, the launch will start that clock running.266 Under the forfeiture laws, if company #1 cannot launch
(for any other reason), then the domestication of the judgment may
cause a forfeiture of the 180-Day Exclusivity.267 In short, subsequent dossier filers may use the reexamination to not only dislodge
a patent barrier proven to exist in the mind of a court, but also to
gain a competitive advantage in the generic drug marketplace.268
CONCLUSION
In this Article we have illustrated the full ramifications of the
concept of reexamination of a patent through the PTO and its effect on federal court litigation. We proposed that the courts should
unify certain aspects of reexamination with parallel (or prior) federal court litigation. We debunked the allegations that a constitu264

See 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
Id. § 316(a)(5).
266
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2012).
267
Id. § 355(j)(5)(D(i)(I).
268
See, e.g., Ranbaxy Labs. v. Vertex Pharms., Inc., IPR 2013-0024 (P.T.A.B. June 18,
2013) (regarding fosamprenavir). Vertex sued Mylan in traditional Paragraph IV litigation
regarding the ‘989 patent. Several months later, Ranbaxy instigated an IPR against the
‘989 patent by arguing obviousness. Within a few months, Ranbaxy and Vertex settled the
IPR and future Hatch-Waxman Paragraph IV litigation. IPR 2013-0024, Paper No. 69.
Meanwhile, Mylan continued to fight the patent in parallel litigation when the trial judge
denied Mylan’s motion to stay its litigation pending resolution of the parallel IPR. VIIV
Healthcare Co. v. Mylan, Inc., CV 12-1065-RGA, 2013 WL 6094289 (D. Del. Sept. 17,
2013). See also Apotex v. Alcon, IPR 2013-00012 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 2013) (regarding
moxifloxacin). There, Apotex did not challenge the patents in court, likely knowing that
the trial judge and appeals court held the patent valid. Apotex successfully instigated an
IPR on the base patent but ultimately settled its IPR.
265
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tional crisis is afoot. We also debunked the allegation that somehow
running a parallel reexamination is unfair to the patentee. We also
examined the heady civil procedure rules of finality and how finality of a judgment can be either solidified or nullified through reexamination. We also are concerned that the courts are being called
upon to correct perceived inequalities, when in fact the remedy (as
is often the case with statutory application) rests with Congress to
amend the statutes appropriately.269

269

See Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Regardless of the
potential of the statute to produce slightly different consequences for applicants under
similar situations, this court does not take upon itself the role of correcting all statutory
inequities, even if it could. In the end, the law has put a policy in effect that this court
must enforce, not criticize or correct.”).

